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Non-technical summary
This paper investigates the role of several monitoring mechanisms of managerial disciplining in
Belgian, French, German and UK listed companies. Our results are calculated making use of four large
firm databases for all four countries, covering periods of five to eight years.
We find substantial differences across countries. Executive turnover (corrected for natural turnover
like retirement and illness) is strongly related to past performance for all countries apart from
France. Overall, there is little evidence that existing blockholders play an active role in disciplining
underperforming management. In Belgium, France and Germany, there is some evidence that
executive turnover augments when individuals or families (not related to a director), holding
companies or industrial firms own blockholdings. In Germany, we also discover increased bank
monitoring when adding the potential proxy votes to the banks’ equity stakes. However, as the
interaction of blockholdings with performance is not significant, these blockholders do not seem to
replace incumbent management for reasons of disciplining underperformance. In UK firms,
executive directors with voting blocks are successful in impeding executive board restructuring,
and hence in defending their private benefits, even in the wake of poor performance.
Part of the market for blockholdings is a corporate governance market in Belgium and Germany.
Non-financial firms (in Belgium) and financial institutions (in Germany) increase their voting
power when performance is poor, which is followed by increased turnover. In contrast, the markets
for share blocks in the UK and France are not related to managerial disciplining. Little evidence is
discovered of creditor monitoring in companies with high leverage or low interest coverage.
A high proportion of non-executive directors, a proxy for independence from management,
increases the probability of managerial departures in Belgium and France, but non-executives seem
to support incumbent management (even when it is underperforming) in Germany and the UK.
Separating the functions of the chief executive officer (CEO) and the non-executive chairman of
the board facilitates the removal of a poorly performing CEO in Belgium, but not in France or the
UK. In France, it is beneficial to nominate a representative of the main bank to the board. Finally,
in Belgium, Germany and the UK, a large board seems to facilitate managerial disciplining as there
is a higher probability that the board comprises a potential successor to a departing CEO.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Recent corporate governance research has primarily focused on the relation between governance
systems and capital market development, shareholder protection and legal tradition or origin (e.g. La
Porta et al., 1997, 1998, 1999). Several studies show empirically that there is a relation between
corporate governance systems and economic growth on country or industry level. More specifically,
some financial and corporate systems are better suited for specific types of economic activity:
Market-oriented systems stimulate research and development (R&D) efforts and high growth in
industries requiring a high skill level (Carlin and Mayer, 1998, Rajan and Zingales, 1998).
Furthermore, high concentrations of ownership are also associated with high growth of these
industries in developed but not in developing countries (Levine, 1998, 1999).
Still, this research has not sufficiently answered the question whether or not these systems can reduce
agency costs by efficient corporate monitoring which is our main research objective. We focus on one
specific (observable) aspect of corporate governance: the removal of underperforming management in
Belgium, France, Germany and the UK. We analyse whether existing large shareholders discipline
management when corporate performance is poor. Among the blockholders, we distinguish between:
(i) holding companies, (ii) banks, (iii) insurance companies, (iv) investment funds, (v) industrial
and commercial companies, (vi) families, individuals (excluding directors and their relatives) and
private companies (which are under full control of families), (vii) federal or regional authorities,
(viii) executive directors and their families, (ix) non-executive directors and their families, (x) real
estate firms and (xi) the free float. As continental European ownership structures are usually
complex and pyramidal, both direct and indirect control should be taken into consideration. In
addition, we analyse whether the market for share blocks is related to managerial disciplining. If
this is the case, such a market can be considered as a (partial) market for control. Denis and Kruse
(2000) find that even when merger and acquisitions activity slows down, managerial disciplining
does not decrease, which implies that even in market-based systems alternative monitoring
mechanisms are active. We also investigate the role of creditor monitoring and analyse whether or
not specific board composition is beneficial in terms of monitoring.
This study provides a contribution to the literature as it explains the differences in corporate
monitoring by country, explains why various classes of blockholders exert (or not) their voting rights,
and explains which monitoring mechanisms dominate. We empirically assess these claims using a
unique multi-country panel of companies from Germany, Belgium, France and the UK. This study
helps to reduce the lack of non-US research of managerial disciplining and provides new insights
particularly regarding the existence and the workings of a market for corporate control in four
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European countries. However, given the very different legal, historical, and institutional background
of these four countries, our empirical model of managerial disciplining is likely to be too simple.
Therefore, the rather weak evidence we find in this study concerning the different elements of
managerial disciplining does not come at a surprise. But since we are the first to examine the
determinants of management turnover for a range of European countries simultaneously, this study
should be seen as an important first step.
 The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 explores the hypotheses. Section 3
presents the sample selection, data sources, variable description and methodology. Section 4 provides
stylised facts on board structure and turnover, performance and leverage, and ownership structure for
the four countries. The main results of the multi-country Tobit and Logit models are discussed in
section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes.
2. HYPOTHESES
Corporate performance is a (noisy) measure of managerial performance but also reflects the quality of
corporate governance by directors, like strategic advice and corporate monitoring. Since the outcome
of board meetings or of shareholder-management convocations is usually not disclosed, we focus on
visible corporate governance actions, namely the management disciplining process in the wake of
poor performance or a financial crisis.
Share price returns and accounting performance reflect managerial achievements, but both
performance yardsticks comprise measurements problems of managerial quality. Firstly, the
correlation between performance-related management dismissal and past share price performance
may be weaker than expected because past share prices may already have anticipated the beneficial
impact of the removal of poorly performing management by more competent successors. Secondly,
incumbent management can (temporarily) manipulate accounting performance by income-smoothing
and the choice of accounting policies (Pourciau, 1993). Hence, when studying whether or not
management is held responsible for poor performance, it is important to relate managerial turnover to
a variety of performance measures like share price returns, operating and net accounting earnings,
cash flow measures and dividend cuts or omissions1. We expect that top management turnover is
triggered by poor performance (Hypothesis 1).
                                                          
1 Reductions in dividend may be an important critical performance measure as management is generally reluctant to
reduce dividends unless a reduction is unavoidable. Dividend cuts or omissions are associated with unusually poor stock
price and earnings performance (Michaely et al., 1995).
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In  this paper, we investigate which corporate governance mechanisms (if any) are responsible for
managerial disciplining by country and, where there is redundancy, whether some forms dominate
others consistently.
2.1 Blockholder Monitoring
Two aspects of ownership are important in relation to corporate monitoring. Firstly, ownership
concentration because monitoring is only cost effective if a single party becomes large enough to
internalise the costs of corporate control. Such costs are borne by the monitoring shareholder
individually, but the financial benefits resulting from corporate governance actions are only reaped in
proportion to the cash flow rights (Grossman and Hart, 1988). Hence, it pays for small shareholders to
shirk the effort and to free-ride on control. Secondly, the nature of ownership concentration may also
influence the degree of corporate control. That owning a block of shares has value beyond the
financial share price return can be deduced from the fact that blocks are usually sold at a premium,
which suggests the presence of private gains (Barclay and Holderness, 1989). These gains vary
across investors or ownership categories. The source of the control premium is the additional
compensation and perquisites the controlling security holders can accord themselves (Jensen and
Meckling, 1976). Boot and Macey (1999) confirm this argument by showing that higher premiums
are commanded in countries with weaker investor protections. That different classes of owners have
different abilities to extract control rents is supported by evidence from the US (Demsetz and Lehn,
1985; Barclay and Holderness, 1991).
Private benefits and reasons for control accumulation for (industrial) holding companies are manifold:
e.g. the cost of capital of the group members may be reduced if the holding company creates an
internal market for funds or if tax reductions are captured by inter-company transfers (see, e.g.
Banerjee et al., 1997 for France and Renneboog, 2000 for Belgium). Likewise, corporate
blockholders may acquire voting rights in order to hold a board seat at a supplier or customer
company. This way the blockholder may influence and/or capitalise on the target’s strategic decisions.
In contrast to other outside shareholders, little corporate monitoring is expected from institutional
investors. The main reason is insider trading regulation: Non-public corporate information may
temporarily reduce the liquidity of institutions’ investments (Renneboog, 1997).2 Finally, whereas
non-executive director-blockholders should discipline poorly performing management in line with
their fiduciary duties, executive directors owning large blocks may be able to impede executive board
restructuring. This group extracts different types of private benefits: cash and options-based
compensation and, possibly, non-pecuniary benefits of being an executive director. Thus, Hypothesis
                                                          
2 Stapledon and Bates (2001) propose changes in UK voting regulation to stimulate institutional shareholder activism.
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2 states: In the wake of poor performance, the presence of large outside blockholders (holding
companies, industrial or commercial firms, individuals and families not related to a director) and
large inside blockholders with monitoring tasks (non-executive directors) leads to higher executive
board turnover (2a). Executive directors controlling a high concentration of voting rights resist
managerial disciplining (2b). Conflicts of interest dissuade institutions to take disciplinary corporate
control actions (2c). Given that the distribution of blockholdings across investor categories varies
across Belgium, France, Germany and the UK, the relation between blockholdings by type of owner
and managerial disciplining may differ across these countries.
As ownership pyramids or cascades are widely used in Belgium, France and Germany for reasons of
control leverage (Wymeersch, 1994), true control is not found at the direct ownership tier. For each
direct shareholding, we have constructed the ownership pyramid until the ultimate shareholder (a
family or individual, or a widely held (holding) company or an institutional investor) was reached.
We have assumed that control was not interrupted throughout the control chain of the pyramid if the
shareholder at the next ownership tier held at least 50 percent of the equity, or at least 25 percent
with no other shareholder owning a block of 25 percent (‘ultimate control criterion’). The direct
blocks were classified into one of ten shareholder categories (see section 3.2) according to the
identity of the ultimate shareholder. We illustrate this criterion with an example based on the
(simplified) shareholding structure of the Belgian Group Brussels Lambert (GBL) (see Figure 1). Via
the intermediate electricity holding Electrafina, GBL has important share stakes in a Belgian-French
energy holding (TotalFinaElf), in a German media group (Bertelsmann) and one of the largest French
utilities (Suez). On top of the pyramid the families Frère-Bourgeois maintain absolute control via five
intermediate levels of holding companies.3 The advantage of such an ownership structure is obvious:
Albert Frère holds a blocking minority of 25 percent in the Bertelsmann Group but only holds less than
0.88 percent of the cash flow rights in Bertelsmann. In this study, we would classify the 25 percent
stake in Bertelsmann not as a shareholding controlled by the utility Electrafina but as a block
controlled by Albert Frère (category ‘individuals or families excluding directors’, provided Frère does
not have a board seat).
As corporate governance decisions may not be taken by direct or intermediate investors but by
ultimate shareholders, we expect that the relation between turnover and concentration of voting
rights held (directly or indirectly) by ultimate blockholders is stronger than between turnover and
direct share blocks (Hypothesis 3).
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE]
2.2 The Market for Share Blocks
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Poor corporate performance (in absolute terms or relative to industry peers) results to a large extent
from poor managerial performance. Still, poor performance also reflects ineffective monitoring and
control. Therefore, a market in blocks may be triggered by corporate underperformance such that high
quality monitors substitute low quality monitors. These blockholders with increased voting power are
expected to discipline poorly performing management. Bolton and von Thadden (1998) and Burkart
et al. (1997) argue that the degree of voting right concentration acts as a commitment device to
delegate a certain degree of authority from shareholders to management. They show that the use of
equity implements state-contingent control: In states of the world with decreasing corporate
profitability, close monitoring resulting from strong ownership concentration is desirable. In other
states of the world, it may not be optimal to have close monitoring as this may reduce managerial
discretion and hence management's effort. For the US, Bethel et al. (1998) find that activist purchases
take place in poorly performing, diversified US firms. Thus, poor performance gives rise to changes
in the ownership structure which are, in turn, associated with higher managerial turnover
(Hypothesis 4).
2.3 Board Composition, Board Size and Creditor Monitoring
The structure of the board should be such that the potential conflicts of interest among decision-
makers and residual-risk bearers are minimised. Board composition should also reduce the
transaction or agency costs associated with the separation of management, ownership and control.
An important task of the non-executive directors of a one-tier board or a supervisory board is that
of control. Non-executive directors have strong incentives to monitor: Firstly, they are legally
bound due to their fiduciary duty. Still, non-executive blockholders in the UK are expected to be
better monitors because their fiduciary duties are wider and more developed than in continental
Europe (Baums, 2000). Secondly, in a system with strong ownership concentration, many non-
executives are appointed by and represent large shareholders. Finally, non-executives have
incentives to develop reputations as decision control experts whose human capital depends on
performance. Consequently, non-executive directors face an external labour market which
provides some form of disciplining for passive leadership (Kaplan and Reishus, 1990). Separating
the role of CEO and non-executive chairman can also strengthen the board’s monitoring ability as
a non-executive chairman should be more able to ensure a higher degree of independence from
management.4 Consequently, we expect that the greater the proportion of non-executive directors,
the higher the monitoring ability of the non-executive directors which is reflected in increased
                                                                                                                                                                                              
3 There was a voting pact until 2017 between Powercorp and Agesca.
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executive turnover when performance is poor. Separating the functions of CEO and chairman
facilitates disciplining of underperforming management. (Hypothesis 5)
In as much as the board of directors is a pool of potential successors to a departing CEO, board size
may be an explanatory variable of CEO and executive director turnover. We do not only include
executive board size in the model but also the number of executive and non-executive directors as it
sometimes occurs that a non-executive director accepts the function of CEO (or executive director).
We therefore state that a large board size is positively related to executive board turnover
(Hypothesis 6). Still, the alternative hypothesis is that there should be a limit to the total board size,
because overly large boards may lead to inefficient decision-making.
Creditor intervention is expected when the probability of defaulting on debt covenants increases or
when the company needs to be refinanced. The choice of gearing can be considered as a bonding
mechanism for management (e.g. Aghion and Bolton, 1992). High leverage or low interest coverage
intensifies creditor monitoring and managerial disciplining (Hypothesis 7).
3. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
3.1 Sample Selection and Data Sources
A. Germany
A sample of 361 German companies is collected for the years 1987-94, representing almost all non-
financial firms listed on a German stock exchange. Financial companies (banks, insurance
companies) are excluded because their balance sheet data are not comparable with those of non-
financial companies. Bankrupt companies, initial public offerings (IPO) and acquired firms are
included until the year of bankruptcy, from the year of floatation or until the last year of quotation,
respectively. Turnover and ownership data are collected for the period 1987-94 and accounting
performance data start in 1986 when a change in German accounting law made balance sheet data
prior to 1986 incompatible with subsequent data. The data sources are presented in the data
appendix.
B. Belgium
The sample consists of all Belgian companies listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange during the period
1989-1994. In 1989 and 1994, respectively, 186 and 165 companies were listed. Nine firms (mostly
from steel and coal industries) are excluded as these firms had been in liquidation processes for long
periods and reliable performance data are missing. Bankrupt companies, IPOs and acquired firms
                                                                                                                                                                                              
4 Such recommendations have been formulated in the U.K. Cadbury Committee report of 1992 (and the subsequent Hampel
commission of 1997), the French Viénot reports 1999, the Belgian corporate governance guidelines by the Stock Exchange
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over the period 1989-94 are included until the year of bankruptcy, from the year of floatation or until
the last year of quotation, respectively. About 40 percent of the Belgian listed companies are holding
companies with multi-industry investments, 47 percent are industrial or commercial companies and
13 percent are in the financial sector (banking, insurance and real estate). For reasons stated above,
we exclude this last category of firms from our analysis. Data on turnover and ownership are collected
for the period 1989-94, and accounting and share price performance data start in 1987. The data
appendix lists the sources.
C. France
The sample consists of the 325 non-financial companies listed on the First Market of the Paris
Stock Exchange for which data on ownership concentration and turnover are available over the
period 1988-92.5 Incomplete accounting and share price data reduces the number of companies to
323. Bankrupt companies, IPOs and acquired firms are included until the year of bankruptcy, from
the year of floatation or until the last year of quotation, respectively. Data on turnover and
ownership were collected for the period 1988-1992 and performance data start in 1986. The data
appendix reveals the data sources.
D. The UK
From all companies listed on the London Stock Exchange, a random sample of 250 companies is
selected for the years 1989-93.6 This sample excludes financial institutions. Data on board turnover
and ownership are collected for the period 1988-93 and performance data start in 1986. Eight of the
original 250 companies are dropped because of lack of performance data. Both beneficial and non-
beneficial shares are collected. The latter are held by directors on behalf of families and charitable
trusts. These directors do not obtain cash flow benefits from these holdings but they have control
rights. We also investigate nominee holdings which are used in 95 percent of the cases by
institutional investors to reduce administrative costs. The nominee shareholdings are classified
according to category of owner using nominee accounts. The data appendix presents the data
sources.
We have taken care that all variables are whereever possible defined similarly and that observations
are picked by comparable selection procedures. The share price and accounting variables, as
described in section 3.2, have the same definitions. The differences in precision of ownership data
across countries depend mainly on the regulatory and institutional context of each country. For
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Commission, the Association of Employers and the Commission for Banking and Finance (all in 1998).
5 The First Market or the Official Market consists of two submarkets: (1) Monthly settlement market (RM, règlement
mensuel) with 190 French stocks and 90 foreign ones and (2) cash market with 260 French stocks and 110 foreign
ones (with a transaction volume 25 times lower than that of the RM).
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example, for Belgium, France and Germany ownership is disclosed for blocks of five percent,
whereas in the UK this threshold is at three percent. The variables are adjusted to the institutional
governance context by country: e.g. direct blockholdings are used for the UK, whereas the ownership
data are reclassified using information about the ownership cascades for Belgium, France and
Germany. Our initial intention to identify disciplinary turnover by collecting the reasons for
resignation had to be abandoned because the reasons usually mentioned in the press or in annual
reports were put in euphemistic terms and were hence non-informative (e.g. ‘CEO wants to spend
more time with his family’, ‘retires aged 42’). Therefore, we assumed that all turnover is disciplinary
unless the turnover was the result of age-related retirement, death or illness (‘natural turnover’).7
3. 2 Methodology and variable description
A panel of data is formed with the eight years of data for Germany, six years for Belgium and the
UK, and five years for France with each firm-year representing a separate observation. The relation
between board restructuring, and performance, ownership, changes in ownership, leverage, board
structure and board size is examined in the following model:
TURNOVERi,t = 
=
4
1C
COUNTRYC  * [ 
=
2
0k
βc,,k * PERFORMc,i,t-k Performance (lagged)
+ 
=
4
1l
γc,l * BLOCKc,i,l,t-1 + 
=
4
1l
δ c,l * BLOCKc,i,l,t-1 * PERFORMc,i,l,t-1 Ownership concentration and interaction
+ 
=
4
1l
πc,l * INCREASEc,i,l,t + 
=
4
1l
θ c,l * INCREASEc,i,l,t * PERFORMc,i,l,t-1   Market in blocks and interaction
+ 
=
2
1m
φc,m * DEBTc,i,m,t-1 + 
=
2
1m
ηc,m * DEBTc,i,m,t-1 * PERFORMc,i,m,t-1 Debt policy and interaction
+ 
=
2
1n
ϕc,n * BOARDc,i,n,t + 
=
2
1n
λc,n * BOARDc,i,n,t * PERFORMc,i,n,t-1 Board variables and interaction
+ θc * SIZEc,i,t]+ 
=
86
1p
ιp  Industryi,t  + 
=
7
1q
τq * Yeari,t   + εi,t Size; industry and time dummies
with i = firm, t = year, c = country, k = lag of performance, l = class of owner, m = debt policy
variable, n = board composition variable, p = country-specific industry, q = year.
- TURNOVER = Board restructuring, measured by (1) executive director turnover, (2) CEO or
executive chairman turnover.
- COUNTRY = Belgium, France, Germany or the UK.
                                                                                                                                                                                              
6 The UK has a higher proportion of recent IPOs (17% of the sample were introduced within a 5 year period prior
1989) than the other countries. The results in section 5 are not influenced by the number of recent IPOs.
7 Weisbach (1988) also mentions that reasons for turnover are often lacking and likewise excludes retirements if they are
age related (63 years or older). This eliminates most of the non-linearity in the turnover-age relationship. The turnover data
for Belgium, France and the UK were corrected for natural turnover, but for Germany, information about directors’ age
was not available, hence the German dependent variable is more noisy. However, in spite of the measurement error in the
dependent variable, the estimation process still yields consistent parameter estimates.
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- PERFORM = performance variable measured by current and lagged (by one or two years) (i) return
on assets (ROA), (ii) return on equity (ROE), (iii) return on sales (ROS), (iv) market-adjusted return
(v) market-to-book ratio, (vi) cash flow on book equity, (vii) cash flow on assets, (viii) earnings losses
(dummy) and (ix) dividend cuts and omissions (dummy). All performance variables (apart from the
dummy variables) are corrected for their two-digit industry median by country.
- BLOCK = ownership concentration by class of owner: (i) holding companies, (ii) banks, (iii)
insurance companies, (iv) investment funds, (v) industrial and commercial companies, (vi) families,
individuals (excluding directors and their relatives) and private companies (which are under full
control of families), (vii) federal or regional authorities, (viii) executive directors and their families,
(ix) non-executive directors and their families,8 (x) real estate firms and (xi) the free-floating
shares.9 Both the percentages of ownership by category of owner and the percentage held by the
largest shareholder are included (in separate regressions). The direct shareholdings are reclassified
according to the ultimate control criterion (described in section 2). The data include only voting
shares. In the multi-country models, we reduce the number of categories to four to keep the model
parsimonious: institutions (categories (ii), (iii), (iv) and (x)), corporations (categories (i) and (v)),
government (vii) and individuals (categories (vi), (viii) and (ix)). In sections 5.1 and 5.2, we show the
results using these four categories and discuss the results with the more detailed ownership categories
in section 5.3.
- INCREASE = purchases (in percentage) of share stakes by old and new shareholders (combined),
by category of owner. To determine the increases by category of owner, the ultimate control criterion
is used (see section 2).
- DEBT = debt to total assets ratio, interest coverage (EBIT/interest expenses).
- BOARD = board size (number of directors, for Germany only the number of supervisory board
members) and the percentage of non-executive directors (for Germany, we divide the number of
directors in the supervisory board by the combined number of managerial and supervisory directors).
For individual country models, we include country-specific board variables such as separation of the
functions of CEO and chairman (1 = no separation) and the percentage of board representatives of
shareholders, debtholders or founders.
- SIZE = natural logarithm of total assets.
                                                          
8 Individuals and families are classified as executive/non-executive directors if the last name of the shareholder
matches with the name of a director. In so far as directors are part of a family which owns shares, but do not carry the
same last name, the categories for executive/non-executive shareholders are underestimated.
9 The percentage of free-floating shares is the percentage of shares for which no information about the ownership is
available as these share stakes do not pass the disclosure threshold. For Germany, when these free-floating shares are
held by private investors, they will be likely to be deposited with a German bank. As individuals usually delegate
voting of the deposited shares to the depositary banks (Gottschalk, 1988), these free-floating shares might de facto be
under the control of banks.
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The Pearson correlation coefficients for variables is calculated and used to investigate possible multi-
collinearity as variables with too high a correlation were not included simultaneously.10
LOGIT models are used if the dependent variable is a dummy (in the case of CEO turnover). For
executive director turnover, TOBIT models are used because the dependent variable (turnover) is
truncated at zero and one. Prior to running the global multi-country model described above, we
investigate simpler models by adding step-by-step more independent variables to examine the
additional explanatory power of specific groups of variables. In a first simple model, turnover is
explained by performance observed for three consecutive years (year t, year t-1 and year t-2). Next,
we extend this basic model by adding concentration of share ownership, changes in ownership and
firm size. In a third step, all governance mechanisms discussed above are included. Finally, in a
fourth step we interact all governance variables with lagged performance to test which governance
mechanism is typically active to discipline management in case of poor performance.11 All models
include two-digit country-specific industry dummies12 and time dummies, which are not reported.
The fact that we run the model using a pooled sample of all four countries has two major
advantages. First, coefficients are directly comparable in their magnitude such that comparison
between countries is straightforward. Second, in the pooled model we allow country-specific
residuals to be correlated and we estimate the full variance-covariance matrix of the estimators
simultaneously. This has the advantage that coefficients are estimated more efficiently. Typically
this procedure leads to lower standard errors for the estimates.
We also perform several methodological robustness checks. In order to avoid unobserved firm
heterogeneity biasing our results, we run our models for CEO and executive turnover with fixed and
random effects. In section 5 we only show LOGIT and TOBIT models (without fixed or random
effects), but results based on the other estimation techniques are shortly discussed. Further robustness
checks of the model are performed by running regressions by country. In order to cope with outlier
problems, we truncate all performance variables: The value above or below the 1 and 99 percent
thresholds have the same value as those thresholds. We also re-run the models with lagged ownership,
                                                          
10 Table available upon request.
11 In section 5, we report only the results from the first and fourth specification. The results on the second and third
specification are available on request from the authors
12 The reason for including country-specific industry dummies is that we do not have a common industry classification
across all four countries.
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debt and board variables because it may well be that when performance is poor, the managerial
disciplining only takes place after a specific time lag.
4. STYLISED FACTS
Ownership concentration, board structure and performance differ across countries, even across
Belgium, France and Germany which belong to the same generic corporate governance system. This
section highlights the main differences in the variables which are included in the multi-country model.
4.1 Board Characteristics and Turnover
The internal governance mechanism is substantially different across the four countries. In the UK,
Belgium and France, one corporate body combines both management and non-executive directors
whereas in Germany executive and non-executive functions are separated in a management board
(Vorstand) and supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat). Still, the board sizes are similar across countries: The
average Belgian and UK listed firms count 9.4 and 9.5 directors, respectively, with medians of  8 and 9
(see Table 1). French boards are slightly larger with 10.2 directors (median of 10) and the combined
number of directors on the German supervisory and management board amounts to 12.7 with a median
of 9.13 There are marked differences regarding the separation of board control: In Germany the
functions of CEO and chairman of the board are de facto separated given the two-tier board system
whereas in the vast majority of French firms (86 percent) unitary control is standard with a powerful
Président Directeur Generale (PDG) at the helm. In the UK and Belgium, one person combines the
functions of CEO and chairman of the board in about one third of listed firms (Table 1). The number of
firms with unitary board control in these countries has been decreasing to, currently, less than 20
percent as a consequence of the voluntary codes of best corporate governance practice. These codes,
like the Cadbury Code of 1992 and subsequent Hampel commission of 1997 for the UK (Goergen and
Renneboog, 2001a) and the Belgian codes proposed in 1998 by the Brussels stock exchange, the
Commission for Banking and Finance and the employers organisation (VBO) (Goergen and
Renneboog, 2001b) emphasise the need to strengthen board independence by appointing a higher
proportion of independent non-executive directors and by avoiding unitary control (of a CEO). In
contrast, the first French proposal of a corporate governance code by the Viénot Commission in
1995 did not follow the international consensus of separating the functions of CEO and chairman,
which may be explained by the fact that the committee is entirely composed of PDGs. The second
Viénot report of July 1999 tones down its earlier conviction and suggests the option to choose
between unitary or dual control (Dherment and Renneboog, 2001).
                                                          
Corporate monitoring by blockholders in Europe:
12
In Germany and Belgium, the average proportion of non-executive directors amounts to respectively
73.9 percent and 71.8 percent (Table 1). In France, there is frequently only one executive director on the
board, the PDG (CEO/Chairman), whereas in the average listed UK firm, it is the executive directors
that form a board majority with on average 60.5 percent of the board members. In contrast to continental
Europe where the large dominating shareholders usually have board representatives, the non-executive
directors of UK boards’ fiduciary duty extends to all shareholders such that they should take an arm’s
length-position with regard to the dominating shareholders. In Germany, supervisory board
representation of shareholders and employees is enshrined in corporate law. In companies with more
than 500 but fewer than 2000 employees, two thirds of the supervisory board consists of shareholder
representatives whereas in larger firms, a system of quasi-parity co-determination exists (Goergen and
Renneboog, 2001c). In France, 16 percent of the board represents the large shareholders among which the
founding family, and 9.3 percent of the board seats (equivalent to one board seat) is reserved for a
representative of the main bank.14
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE]
Annual CEO turnover in Belgium amounts to only 7.4 percent (Table 2), less than that of the UK (with
12.5 percent), of Germany (with 15.1 percent) and of France (with 18.4 percent). However, whereas in
France, the UK and Germany the annual rate of executive turnover is lower than the rate of CEO
turnover, the picture is different for Belgium: Almost 20 percent of executive directors (one director)
resigns annually for reasons other than retirement, death or illness. Hence, it seems that if board
restructuring is required, an executive director (who is not CEO) is more frequently resigning than the
CEO. In the UK and Belgium, non-executive turnover is substantially lower than the percentage of
executive resignations. This is because the non-executives bear only indirect responsibility for
corporate performance. The high non-executive turnover in Germany also reflects changes in
blockholdings as in most firms 50 to 67 percent of non-executives are large shareholder representatives
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE]
4.2 Performance, Leverage and Firm Size
Table 3 shows performance, debt structure and corporate size data by country. Corporate performance
below an industry benchmark may be an important indication of substandard managerial quality.
Therefore, we use industry-corrected ROA, ROE, ROS in our empirical model in section 5. Table 3
contains some descriptive statistics. Over the sample period, German firms reached the highest market-
corrected share price performance with a small positive median versus negative median returns for the
                                                                                                                                                                                              
13 The data presented in Tables 1-5 do not change significantly by taking the common denominator period, 1989-1992.
14 The board representation percentages may be a severe underestimation because they are based on voluntary
reporting by the companies.
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other country samples. The best performing quartiles of firms in Germany, Belgium and the UK
obtained similar levels of share price returns but the French firms lagged over the sample period (Table
3). Tobin’s Q of UK sample firms is higher than that of the other country sample firms, but the
industry-corrected Tobin’s Q variables are similar in all samples. In terms of persistence of earnings
losses, there are substantial differences: In France ten percent of firms generate losses in three
consecutive years. This stands in stark contrast with the UK, Germany and Belgium where such firms
only make up two percent, three percent and five percent of the samples, respectively. More than one
third of Belgian and French firms cut dividends in any one year of the sample period versus seven
percent in Germany and 16  percent in the UK (Table 3).
In terms of leverage, German firms bank more on debt with a leverage ratio (debt on total assets) of on
average 41 percent. The UK firms’ reliance on debt is less than half this percentage. The median
interest coverage is high for the Belgian, German and UK samples, but low (at 1.53) in France (which
reflects the fact that there are more loss-making firms in the French sample). In terms of total assets
and total sales, Belgian firms are substantially smaller than the average sample firm of the other
countries. The difference in size between Belgian firms and those of the other countries is explained by
the fact that the Brussels stock exchange has a higher proportion of listed small and medium caps and
by the fact that Belgium has hardly any multinational firms. The larger average French size may be the
result of a sample selection problem as the disclosure is worse for small firms such that the smallest
French firms are underrepresented in the sample.
 [INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE]
4.3 Ownership concentration and changes
The sum of all disclosed shareholdings as well as the largest corporate share stake by category of
owner is presented in Table 4. Panel A highlights the strong ownership concentration for Germany:
The sum of all large disclosed shareholdings averages to 68 percent (a median of 75 percent). In most
firms, one single shareholder (group) holds absolute control: The average and median largest share
stake is 60 percent. The most important shareholder category in Germany is industrial and commercial
companies. Directors and their families hold on average almost 18.9 percent whereas individuals or
families which are not related to a director hold 14.1 percent. The average ownership stake of banks is
only 7 percent, but the proxy votes of shareholders depositing their shares with a bank may yield the
banks substantially more voting power (Böhmer, 2000). The Belgian ownership structure is
characterised by the importance of holding companies who control 23.3 percent of the large share
stakes (panel B). Average ownership concentration is lower than in Germany: The sum of all large
share stakes amounts to 52.2 percent, but the largest share stake averages 36.6 percent. In about 20
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percent of the sample, families and individuals control at least a blocking minority and this category
owns an average of 12.1 percent of the voting rights. The degree of ownership concentration in France
(panel C) is more similar to Germany: In the average company, about two thirds of the share stakes are
large (more than 5 percent) and the largest shareholder maintains an absolute majority with 52.9
percent of the voting rights. Like in Belgium, holding companies are important shareholders, as are
other non-financial firms. The involvement of the government is striking: An average share of 12.6
percent in the listed firms is held by state holding companies and banks, although government control
has since dwindled subsequent to privatisation schemes. The degree of ownership concentration in the
UK (panel D) is substantially lower than that of the three other countries, even though the UK data
overstate relative ownership concentration because UK disclosure is based on a three percent threshold
versus five percent in the other countries. Even so, average total concentration in the UK is only 38
percent and the largest stake is 15.4 percent, which is only 40 percent of  the average largest Belgian
share stake and less than 30 percent of the French and German equivalent. Institutional investors are
the most important category of owner as they hold 18 percent of the large share blocks. In reality, their
combined share stakes are about 2.5 times higher as most of these shareholdings do not exceed the
minimal disclosure threshold. Directors are the second most important shareholder category with an
average of 11.2 percent.15
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE]
For almost all Belgian, French and German firms, it is pointless to initiate a hostile raid as the majority
of voting rights are controlled by one party. Nevertheless, in these countries a market for share blocks
exists. The percentage of sample firms in which a large share stake within a specific size bracket is
purchased and sold is exhibited in Table 5. In Germany (panel A), the market for share stakes is small:
Over a seven-year period there are no substantial purchases in 1994 out of 2378 firm-years. This
means that in about 16 percent of listed industrial or commercial firms large share blocks are
purchased. In nine percent and five percent of firms, these share blocks are at least a blocking minority
(25 percent) and a voting rights majority (50 percent), respectively. Holding companies and the
government are net sellers of stakes of more than 25 percent whereas individuals and families are net
buyers. The Belgian market for share stakes is larger but involves relatively smaller blocks than in
Germany. In 21 percent of Belgian firms, existing shareholders augment their stakes by more than five
percent, or new shareholders purchase stakes of this size. In only 6.3 percent of the listed companies
are these shareholdings larger than 25 percent. Panel B shows that the percentage of firms with sales
and purchases for all categories of owner combined is about as large which indicates that share blocks
do not tend to be broken up. Whereas institutional investors, and individuals and families sell
                                                          
15 The descriptive ownership data are in line with the description of voting rights concentration by the European
Corporate Governance Network of which the results are presented in Barca and Becht (2001) and Köke (2001).
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important share stakes of at least 25 percent, banks and especially industrial and commercial
companies increase their controlling holdings. Of the three continental European countries, France has
the most active market for control stakes as in 39 percent of listed firms share stakes are acquired (and
sold) (panel C). In a large number of listed firms, 13.7 percent, these purchases involve important
control changes of 25 percent or more. Holding companies, banks and industrial and commercial firms
further accumulate control whereas the government, individuals and families and directors sell off
important blocks of voting rights. Given the diffuse ownership structure in the UK, hostile take-overs
are possible. Still, shareholders desiring to control a UK company often do not resort to full take-overs
but accumulate voting rights to a percentage just below 30 percent (Goergen and Renneboog, 2001a).
This is the threshold triggering a mandatory tender offer for all remaining share stakes at a share price
not lower than the lowest share price during last twelve months. Given that in the average company
the largest shareholder owns a block of about 15 percent, we can investigate the relative importance of
blocks of e.g. ten percent in panel D. In 40 percent of sample firms, shareholdings of at least ten
percent were purchased.
From this section, we conclude that the German and French ownership structures are substantially
more concentrated than that of the UK. In the latter, institutions and directors hold the largest blocks of
voting rights whereas other corporations, families and holding companies prevail in the continental
European countries. In contrast to Belgium and Germany, France has a more active market in
controlling share stakes. In relative terms, the UK also has an important market for share blocks, but
the blocks remain under the 30 percent tender-offer threshold.
 [INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
5. RESULTS
This section discusses the results of the multi-country Tobit and Logit models of executive turnover
and CEO turnover. We also report the results of several robustness checks which were performed by
including lagged and alternative variables and by specifying alternative estimation techniques (e.g.
fixed effects).
5.1 The executive turnover models
For Germany, Belgium and the UK, we find a statistically significant relation between performance
and executive turnover (Table A1 of the appendix). In German firms, executive dismissals increase
when industry-adjusted ROA, ROE, ROS or the market-adjusted share price return is negative in the
previous period, or when the company realises losses in two consecutive years (see panels A-G in
Table A1). These results are also economically significant: A negative industry-adjusted ROA of
minus ten percent is followed in the subsequent year by an increased executive turnover of twelve
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percent, and persisting earnings losses cause 34 percent of the executives to leave the firm. For the UK,
the results are even more outspoken: current and past performance measured by ROA, ROE, ROS,
share price returns, losses and dividend cuts are all significantly correlated to increased turnover.
Earnings losses in two consecutive years even lead to resignation of half of the executive directors.
There is a longer time lag (of up to two years) between poor performance (ROA and ROE) and
director dismissal in Belgium. These results support Hypothesis 1, but not for France where the
performance-turnover link is weak.
The results of the multi-country executive director turnover model with four performance variables
(industry-adjusted ROA and ROE, market-adjusted returns and Tobin’s Q) are presented in Tables 6a
(models 1 and 2) and 6b (models 3 and 4). All variables are interacted with lagged performance. In
addition, all variables, including the variables interacted with performance, are interacted with country
dummy variables. Lines 4 to 11 in Tables 6a and 6b show whether or not the presence of large
blockholders of four generic ownership categories is related to managerial turnover. The categories
are: (i) individuals or families (including directors), (ii) financial firms consisting of banks, insurance
companies and investment/pension funds, (iii) non-financial firms consisting of industrial or
commercial firms and holding companies and (iv) government-controlled ownership. The corporate
governance role of large blockholders can be deduced from the interactive terms of ownership with
performance. If blockholders monitor and discipline management in the wake of poor performance, we
expect to see significant negative interactive coefficients in lines 5, 7, 9 and 11 for models 1-3. If only
the non-interactive ownership variables are related to executive turnover (lines 4, 6, 8, 10 of models 1-
3), we can conclude that the large shareholders have some impact on the resignation of executive
directors but that turnover is non-performance related but for example due to a strategy conflict with
shareholders or the move to a better paid job.
In German firms, models 1 to 4 all point out that higher executive turnover occurs when individuals or
families, or non-financial firms hold important share blocks (lines 4 and 8 of Tables 6a and 6b).
Likewise, there is not much evidence of corporate monitoring and performance-related disciplining of
management in Belgian firms. Lines 4 and 10 of Tables 6a and 6b suggest that neither the government
nor individuals or families perform an active corporate control role: When they control substantial
share stakes, executive turnover is reduced. Furthermore, contrary to our expectations, large
concentration of ownership held by financial firms (lines 7) and industrial or holding companies (lines
9) are related to increases in managerial resignations when performance is high. In French listed firms,
there is no consistent relationship between turnover and ownership concentration, which confirms the
findings of Banerjee et al. (1997) for French holding companies. Finally, remarkable for UK firms is
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the negative relationship between shareholding concentration by individuals and families and
managerial disciplining in models 1-4. This ownership variable amalgamates these categories: (a)
executive and (b) non-executive directors and their families as well as (c) individuals and families not
related to a director. Substituting the detailed categories for the amalgamated category shows that it is
the executive directors who are able to impede executive turnover. The fact that only the non-
interactive term of executive director ownership is significant implies that executive directors can
successfully defend their position even in the wake of poor performance. Managerial entrenchment is
also documented for the US by Denis et al. (1997) and for the UK by Franks et al. (2001). Apart from
the resistance against board monitoring in the UK, we find little evidence of performance-induced
managerial disciplining. We conclude that, whereas Hypothesis 2a is not supported by these findings,
Hypotheses 2b and 2c are.16
[INSERT TABLES 6a AND 6b ABOUT HERE]
We also investigate whether the market in share blocks leads to increased board restructuring.
Especially in the wake of corporate underperformance, we expect that those blockholders with better
monitoring ability or a managerial alternative increase control. In Germany, we find that when
individuals (including directors) and families increase control, executive director turnover augments
(line 12 of models 1-4). However, as the interactive term with performance (line 13) is not statistically
significant, we cannot conclude that the executives’ resignation is the result of performance-induced
monitoring by families. Models 1 and 2 (line 15 of Table 6a) point out that when German performance
is negative and institutions (primarily the banks) increase their blockholding, more resignations from
the management board can be expected. Increases in voting blocks by non-financial corporations are
strongly positively correlated with increased turnover (models 1, 2 and 4, line 16) which could mean
that new powerful non-financial firms restructure the management board for reasons not related to past
performance. Köke (2000) reports stronger evidence that block transfers coincide with poor
performance and are followed by increased layoffs of employees and board restructuring. Still, the
subsequent performance increase is only modest. For Belgium, we find strong statistical evidence that
when industrial or commercial companies increase their blockholding or acquire a large block, more
executive directors resign (line 16 in Tables 6a and 6b). The fact that executive directors turnover is
amplified when past performance is very poor (cf. the negative sign of line 17 in models 1 and 2)
indicates that non-financial firms augment their voting power with the intention of disciplining
underperforming top management. A more detailed analysis shows that it is industrial and commercial
firms rather than holding companies which discipline management. In France, increases in
                                                          
16 We also ran models with direct ownership for Belgium and France (not for Germany as only the indirect ownership
relations are available). We find weaker relations than the ones described in section 5.1, which gives some indirect
support for Hypothesis 3.
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blockholdings by non-financial firms in French listed firms is also related to increased executive
turnover. However, for this sample, we cannot conclude that the increased resignations are the result of
a performance-related monitoring process. For UK sample firms, increases in share blocks by
individuals and families are positively correlated to executive resignation (line 12).
We conclude that the market for share blocks in the UK and France does not seem to be related to
managerial disciplining. However, there is some evidence for Germany and Belgium that part of the
transactions in the block market occurs for corporate governance reasons: Industrial and commercial
companies and banks who increase their voting power in Belgium and Germany, respectively, seem to
cause increased turnover of poorly performing management. Hypothesis 4 is rejected for France and
the UK, but not for Germany and Belgium.
High debt leverage or low interest coverage, combined with poor corporate performance, may lead to
increased director dismissal as a result of creditor monitoring. Tables 6a and 6b show that their
leverage is positively related to executive turnover for Belgium, France and Germany  (model 2), but
there is little consistency in this relationship across all models. Therefore, we reject Hypothesis 5.
The size of the board of directors has an important impact on executive resignations: the larger the
board, the higher executive turnover in Germany, Belgium and the UK (line 24). Hence we fail to
reject Hypothesis 6 which states that a large board may provide a pool of potential permanent (or
temporary) successors, which facilitates absorbing the vacuum left by a resigning director. For
Germany and the UK, this relationship is independent of past performance. Still, the fact that for
Belgium the interactive term of board size with past performance is negative (in models 1-4, but
significant only in model 1) provides some evidence that the size of board as potential managerial pool
is especially important if the resignation was related to past underperformance. In this case, given that
the board may be responsible for the poor performance due to a lack of effective monitoring, hiring an
outside successor may be more appropriate.
A large number of non-executive directors may guarantee a higher degree of independence from
management and thus more efficient monitoring of managerial performance. For Belgian listed firms,
the higher the percentage of non-executive directors, the higher executive turnover although this
relation is not associated with performance. For the UK and Germany, we find the opposite results:
Here a large percentage of non-executives reduces executive directors dismissal. Franks et al. (2001)
come to similar conclusions for the UK and state that non-executives usually vote to support
incumbent management. The lack of sufficient monitoring by non-executive directors in the UK in the
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pre-Cadbury period is also described by Conyon and Peck (1998) who show that boardroom control is
not related to management compensation schemes. Finally, Tables 6a and 6b show that executive
director turnover in Germany, France and the UK is larger in smaller firms.
5.2 CEO turnover models
Table 7 shows the results for two multi-country models that explain CEO turnover. In all countries, the
negative signs in lines 1-3 prove that there is strong statistical significance that CEO departures
augment when past and current performance was poor, which supports Hypothesis 1.17 For Germany,
there is a strong correlation between the control structure and CEO resignations: Large blockholdings
held by individuals and families, and non-financial companies lead to increased executive turnover
(lines 4 and 8 of Table 7). When the category of individuals and families is divided into directors, and
individuals or families not related to a director, we find that the positive correlation is due to the latter
(not shown in the Table). Lines 5 and 9 show that the relation between CEO departure and holdings by
individuals or families is negative when performance is poor. An analysis with more detailed
ownership classes reveals that this finding is caused by insider ownership: When performance is poor,
executive directors are able to resist disciplining. As this relation is even stronger when performance is
good, these German blockholders do not perform a monitoring and disciplining role (lines 5 and 9).
For Belgian listed firms, the presence of major blockholders (individuals/families, financial and non-
financial firms) in well-performing companies increases the probability that the CEO resigns. For
France, we get the opposite picture, the negative interaction terms in lines 5, 7 and 9 point out that the
CEO is dismissed when individuals or families, or non-financial firms hold important blocks of voting
rights and performance is poor. A detailed analysis with eight ownership categories reveals that it is the
industrial companies who are active monitors: When these companies own a high percentage of the
voting rights or increase their control stake, the probability of CEO turnover augments. Holding
companies do not seem to enhance efficiency by way of monitoring, which does not conflict with the
findings of Banerjee et al. (1997) who even stress the detrimental effect of blockholdings held by
holding companies. Large share blocks have little impact on CEO turnover in the UK where major
share blocks in the hands of individuals or families lead to lower odds of CEO resignation. Thus, we
conclude that there is strong evidence of performance-related monitoring by outsider shareholders in
France, but Hypothesis 2a is not supported for the other countries. We fail to reject Hypothesis 2b as
there is strong evidence of insider shareholder resistance to board restructuring for Germany and the
UK. Given that institutions do not monitor – with the exception of France – we do not reject
Hypothesis 3c.
                                                          
17 It should be noted that the significance of the performance terms in lines 1-3 underestimates the true correlation as
some of the statistical significance of the lagged performance is absorbed by the interaction terms.
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The market for share stakes in Germany cannot be considered as a corporate governance market: Large
increases in blocks held by individuals and families lead to the resignation of the CEO but not only in
cases of low corporate performance. When non-financial firms increase their voting power, it seems
that they desire to nominate a CEO of their choice, but in this resignation process the CEO’s past
performance does not seem to matter. For Belgium, increases in share blocks controlled by non-
financial firms are – independent of corporate performance - positively correlated with CEO departure
(line 16). Similarly, individuals and families who increase their shareholding in a French listed firm
when market-adjusted ROA is negative are more likely to replace the CEO. The market for share
blocks is not correlated with CEO turnover in the UK. Apart from French listed firms, we reject
Hypothesis 3 that the market for blocks is a corporate control market.
In the UK and Germany, the larger the number of directors, the larger CEO turnover (line 24). For
Germany, this is especially the case when the CEO’s past performance is weak (line 25). A large
number of non-executives in Germany is negatively related to turnover, whereas we find the opposite
sign for France.
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE]
5.3 Robustness checks and additional governance characteristics
Tables 6a, 6b and 7 show only a limited number of all models tested. We also test models with other
performance measures such as cash flow on equity, earnings losses, dividend cuts, with and without
correction for industry median. The results discussed above are confirmed by models with earnings
losses and dividend cuts, but are weaker when including cash flow variables or absolute measures of
ROA and ROE. The robustness of the findings discussed in sections 5.1 and 5.2 is further investigated
by running the respective models with fixed and with random effects.18 The results obtained do not
differ qualitatively from the results reported above. We also estimate models for each country
separately and add some explanatory variables unique to each country. For example, apart from
Germany with its two-tier board system, the separation of the function of CEO and chairman of the
board may be an important factor stimulating non-executive independence for Belgium, France and
UK. We find that separating the functions of CEO and (non-executive) chairman of the board matters
in Belgium: Separation facilitates dismissing the CEO and executive directors. For France, the CEO
turnover relation is also statistically significant but with a negative sign. Although this relation is
counter-intuitive, it should be noted that such a separation is probably not very crucial for French
                                                          
18 These tables are available upon request.
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boards, because in many cases the CEO is the only executive on the board. Hence, in corporate
governance terms, it may not matter whether the CEO also chairs a French board.
For France, we also collect data on the percentage of the board members representing the large
shareholder, the debtholders (banks) and the founding family. We find no relation between managerial
disciplining and shareholder representation on French boards. Still, what does matter for France is
whether or not the board comprises representatives of the main debtholders, usually a large French
bank. In this case, the probability of CEO resignation following poor corporate performance increases.
German banks may have a more powerful position resulting from proxy votes deposited by
shareholders (Gorton and Schmid, 2000). Although data on proxy votes are not available, we proxied
this bank proxy voting process by adding the free floating shares to the bank equity stakes.19 In the
CEO turnover models, we found strong evidence that the banks’ voting power matters in the
disciplinary process of underforming management (statistically significant interaction term at the one-
percent level).
It should be noted that this study focuses on drastic governance actions, namely managerial
disciplining when performance is poor. However, these actions may be an instrument of last resort as a
slight reduction of performance may be penalised by other governance mechanisms like performance-
related remuneration schemes. Still, the effectivess of such compensation schemes has been shown to
depend on the ownership structure (Toshi and Gomez-Mejia, 1994). Unfortunately, top management
compensation is not disclosed in Belgium, France and Germany.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper investigates the role of several monitoring mechanisms of managerial disciplining in
Belgian, French, German and UK listed companies. First, large blockholders are expected to exert a
corporate monitoring task provided their ownership stakes are sufficiently large to internalise the costs
of monitoring. Interacting these blockholdings with past performance enables us to investigate
whether or not executive turnover is related to past managerial underperformance. Second, we
investigate whether a market in share stakes is a (partial) corporate control market. This is the case
if blockholders accumulate control in the wake of poor performance and subsequently force
management to resign. A third monitoring mechanism is the creditors, who are expected to dismiss
management not only when performance is poor but especially when leverage is high or interest
                                                          
19 Adding to full free float to the banks’ equity stakes may lead to an overestimation as some of the free floating shares
are held by institutions. Still, assigning only 75 percent of the free-float to the banks yields the same results.
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coverage is low. Fourth, board structure and composition – measured by percentage of non-
executive directors, separation of control, board representation – may be a proxy for the degree of
independence of the non-executive directors. We collect four large databases for Belgium, France,
Germany and the UK with panel data over periods of five to eight years. The multi-country model of
managerial disciplining are estimated using Logit and Tobit models.
We find substantial differences across countries. Executive turnover (corrected for natural turnover
like retirement and illness) is strongly related to past performance for all countries apart from
France. Overall, there is little evidence that existing blockholders play an active role in disciplining
underperforming management. In Belgium, France and Germany, there is some evidence that
executive turnover augments when individuals or families (not related to a director), holding
companies or industrial firms own blockholdings. However, as the interaction of these
blockholdings with performance is not significant, these blockholders do not seem to replace
incumbent management for reasons of disciplining underperformance. Managers of government
controlled companies in France do not seem to be disciplined when they underperform. In UK
firms, executive directors with voting blocks are successful in impeding executive board
restructuring, and hence defending their private benefits, even in the wake of poor performance.
The blockholdings are calculated and categorised taking into the account the pyramidal ownership
structures for Germany, Belgium and France. The fact that the results are weaker when only
considering direct share blocks yields some evidence that governance decisions are not taken at the
direct ownership level but by the ultimate blockholder. In Germany, we discover increased bank
monitoring when adding the potential proxy votes to the banks’ equity stakes.
Part of the market for blockholdings is a corporate governance market in Belgium and Germany.
Non-financial firms (in Belgium) and financial institutions (in Germany) increase their voting
power when performance is poor, which is followed by increased turnover. In contrast, the markets
for share blocks in the UK and France are not related to managerial disciplining. Little evidence is
discovered of creditor monitoring in companies with high leverage or low interest coverage.
A high proportion of non-executive directors, a proxy for independence from management,
increases the probability of managerial departures in Belgium and France, but non-executives seem
to support incumbent management (even when it is underperforming) in Germany and the UK.
Separating the functions of CEO and non-executive chairman of the board facilitates the removal
of a poorly performing CEO in Belgium, but not in France or the UK. In France, it is beneficial to
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nominate a representative of the main bank to the board. Finally, in Belgium, Germany and the
UK, a large board seems to facilitate managerial disciplining as there is a higher probability that
the board comprises a potential successor to a departing CEO.
REFERENCES
Aghion, P. and P. Bolton (1992), An ‘Incomplete Contracts’ Approach to Financial Contracting,
Review of Economic Studies 59, 473-94.
Banerjee, S., B. Leleux and T. Vermaelen (1997), Large Shareholdings and Corporate Control: An
Analysis of Stake Purchases by French Holding Companies, European Financial Management
3, 23-43.
Barca, F. and M. Becht (2001), The Control of Corporate Europe, Oxford: Oxford University
Press, forthcoming.
Barclay, M.J. and C.G. Holderness (1989), Private Benefits From Control of Public Corporations,
Journal of Financial Economics 25, 371-95.
Barclay, M.J. and C.G. Holderness (1991), Negotiated Block Trades and Corporate Control, Journal
of Finance 46, 861-78.
Baums, T. (2000), Corporate Governance in Germany – System and Current Developments, Working
Paper, University of Osnabrück.
Bethel, J., J. Liebeskind and T. Opler (1998), Block Share Purchases and Corporate Performance,
Journal of Finance 53, 605-34.
Bolton, P. and E.-L. von Thadden (1998), Blocks, Liquidity and Corporate Control, Journal of
Finance  53, 1-25.
Böhmer, E. (2000), Industry Groups, Bank Control, and Large Shareholders: An Analysis of
German Takeovers, Journal of Financial Intermediation 9, 117-48.
Boot, A.W. and J.R. Macey (1999), Objectivity, Control and Adaptability in Corporate
Governance, Corporate Governance Today (Columbia Law School), 223-35.
Burkart, M., D. Gromb and F. Panunzi (1997), Large Shareholders, Monitoring and the Value of the
Firm, Quarterly Journal of Economics 112, 693-728.
Carlin, W. and C. Mayer (1998), How Do Financial Systems Affect Economic Performance,
Working Paper, Said Business School, Oxford University.
Conyon, M. and S. Peck (1998), Board Control, Remuneration Committees and Top Management
Compensation, Academy of Management Journal 41, 146-57.
Demsetz, H. and K. Lehn (1985), The Structure of Corporate Ownership: Causes and Consequences.
Journal of Political Economy 93, 1155-77.
Denis, D.J. and T. Kruse (2000), Managerial Discipline and Corporate Restructuring Following
Performance Declines, Journal of Financial Economics 55, 391-424.
Denis, D.J., D.K. Denis and A. Sarin (1997), Ownership Structure and Top Executive Turnover,
Journal of Financial Economics 45, 193-221.
Dherment, I. and L. Renneboog (2001), Share Price Reactions to CEO Resignations and Large
Shareholder Monitoring in Listed French Companies, forthcoming in: Renneboog, L., J.
McCahery, P. Moerland and T. Raaijmakers (eds.), Convergence and Diversity of Corporate
Governance Regimes and Capital Markets, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Franks, J., C. Mayer and L. Renneboog (2001), Who Disciplines Management in Poorly Performing
Companies?, Working Paper University of Tilburg, Journal of Financial Intermediation,
forthcoming.
Goergen, G. and L. Renneboog (2001a), Strong Managers and Passive Institutional Investors in the
UK, forthcoming in: Barca, F. and M. Becht (eds.), The Control of Corporate Europe, Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Goergen, G. and L. Renneboog (2001b), Corporate Governance and Economic Performance in
Belgium, forthcoming in Gugler, K. (ed.), Corporate Governance and Economic
Performance, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Corporate monitoring by blockholders in Europe:
24
Goergen, G. and L. Renneboog (2001c), The Discrepancy of Ownership and Control
Concentration in German and UK Firms: Evidence from Initial Public Offerings, Journal of
Law, Economics and Organization, forthcoming.
Gorton, G. and F.A. Schmid (2000), Universal Banking and the Performance of German Firms,
Journal of Financial Economics 58, 29-80.
Gottschalk, A. (1988), Der Stimmrechtseinfluss der Banken in den Aktionärsversammlungen von
Großunternehmen, WSI-Mitteilungen 41, 294-304.
Grossman, S.J. and O. Hart (1988), One Share-One Vote and the Market for Corporate Control,
Journal of Financial Economics 20, 175-202.
Jensen, M.C. and  W.H. Meckling (1976), Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, Agency Costs
and Ownership Structure, Journal of Financial Economics 3, 305-60.
Kaplan, S.N. and D. Reishus (1990), Outside Directorships and Corporate Performance, Journal of
Financial Economics 27, 389-410.
Köke, J. (2000), Control Transfers in Corporate Germany: Their Frequency, Causes and
Consequences’, ZEW Discussion Paper No. 00-67, Centre for European Economic Research,
Mannheim.
Köke, J. (2001), New Evidence on Ownership Structures in Germany, Kredit und Kapital 2, 1-36.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1997), Legal Determinants of
External Finance, Journal of Finance 52, 1131-50.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1998), Law and Finance, Journal of
Political Economy 106, 1113-55.
La Porta, R., F. Lopez-de-Silanes, A. Shleifer and R. Vishny (1999), Corporate Ownership Around
the World, Journal of Finance 54, 471-518.
Levine, R. (1998), The Legal Environment, Banks, and Long-Run Economic Growth, Journal of
Money, Credit, and Banking 30, 596-613.
Levine, R. (1999), Law, Finance, and Growth, Journal of Financial Intermediation 8, 8-35.
Michaely, R., R. Thaler and K. Womack (1995), Price Reactions to Dividend Initiations and
Omissions: Overreaction or Drift?, Journal of Finance 50, 573-608.
Pourciau, S. (1993), Earnings Management and Nonroutine Executive Changes, Journal of
Accounting and Economics 16, 317-36.
Rajan, R. and L. Zingales (1998), Financial Dependence and Growth, American Economic Review
88,  559-86.
Renneboog, L. (1997), Shareholdig Concentration and Pyramidal Ownership Structures in Belgium,
in: Balling, M., E. Hennessy and R. O’Brien (eds.), Corporate Governance, Financial Markets
and Global Convergence, Amsterdam: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
Renneboog, L.  (2000), Ownership, Managerial Control and the Governance of Poorly Performing
Companies Listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange, Journal of Banking and Finance 24, 1959-
95.
Stapledon, G. and J. Bates (2001), Unpacking the ‘Interest-Holders’ in a Share: Making Voting
Easier for Institutional Investors, in: Renneboog, L., J. McCahery, P. Moerland and T.
Raaijmakers (eds.), Convergence and Diversity of Corporate Governance Regimes and Capital
Markets, Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming.
Toshi, H. and L. Gomez-Mejia (1994), CEO Compensation Monitoring and Firm Performance,
Academy of Management Journal 37, 1002-16.
Weisbach, M. (1988), Outside Directors and CEO Turnover, Journal of Financial Economics 20,
431-60.
Wymeersch, E. (1994), Aspects of Corporate Governance, Journal of Corporate Governance 2, 138-
49.
Corporate monitoring by blockholders in Europe:
25
DATA APPENDIX
A. Germany
Accounting information is collected from Hoppenstedt, a commercial information provider. In
addition, the Guide through German Companies, edited by the former Hypobank, is used to verify
the Hoppenstedt information and to add missing information. Share price data are obtained from the
Capital Market Database of the University of Karlsruhe. These data are corrected for dividend
payments, stock splits and changes in the nominal value of the shares. Average weekly share prices
are used to calculate yearly returns. The market index DAFOX is also corrected for dividend and
stock splits and takes into account entry and exit of firms to avoid a survivor bias. The interest rate
on short term government bonds is used as a proxy for the riskfree rate and is collected from the
Federal Statistical Office of Germany.
Data on the ownership structure of German companies are collected from the Guide through
German Companies. These handbooks contain information on the direct shareholders (with
ownership of more than 5 percent) of all listed and some large non-listed Germany companies. In
cases in which the Hypobank guides indicate that ownership rights diverge from voting rights, the
respective information on voting rights is used. Information on proxy votes is only accessible at
local courts and therefore is not used. Some firms may implement voting restrictions provided this
is enshrined in the by-laws. We do not dispose these voting restrictions; the use of voting caps is
discussed in Gorton and Schmid (2000). Data on the supervisory board (Aufsichtsrat) and the
managerial board (Vorstand) are collected from the Guide through German Companies. On a year-
by-year basis, turnover of the CEO, of the chairman of the supervisory board,  and of directors in
the managerial and supervisory boards are calculated. In addition, we gather board size and the
percentage of employee and shareholder representatives on the supervisory board.
B. Belgium
Accounting data are collected from annual reports and from the database of Central Depository of
Balance Sheets at the National Bank of Belgium. Weekly share price returns, corrected for stock splits
and dividend pay-outs, and a value-weighted, dividend and stock split-corrected index of all
companies listed on the Brussels Stock Exchange are provided by the Generale Bank. The interest
rate on short term government bonds is used as a proxy for the riskfree rate and collected from
Datastream.
Data on the ownership structure are collected from the Documentation and Statistics Department of
the Brussels Stock Exchange. Ownership data are only available since 1989, following the
introduction of the Ownership Transparency Legislation (of 2 March 1989). Ownership and voting
rights disclosure is obligatory for shareholdings of at least 5 percent. To capture a company's
ownership position at the end of its fiscal year and the yearly changes in shareholdings, about 5000
hardcopy Notifications of Ownership Change from 1989 till 1994 are consulted. With this
information about major direct shareholdings and about indirect control (which is complemented with
details from annual reports), the multi-layered (pyramidal) ownership structures were reconstructed
for each company over the period 1989-1994. The yearbooks of Trends 20,000, which comprise
industry sector classification and financial data for listed and non-listed Belgian companies, are used
to classify all Belgian investors into ownership categories. Foreign investors are classified with
information from Kompass. Reasons for directors’ resignations are collected from the notes in the
annual reports and the financial press.
The database of the National Bank of Belgium also contains information about the board of directors.
Turnover of executive, non-executive, CEO and chairman are collected as well board size and
composition (percentage of non-executive directors). Reasons to leave the company as well as age of
the directors are collected from the notes in the annual reports. Data on size and turnover of the
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management committee are gathered from the annual reports. When the annual report does not
explicitly mention the existence of a management committee, the yearbooks Memento der Effecten
and the Jaarboek der Bestuurders (Yearbook of Directors) are consulted to determine whether or not
directors hold executive functions. If the annual reports or other public sources does not reveal the
data needed, companies are contacted by fax and phone to supplement lacking data.
C. France
Accounting data are collected from the DAFSA fiches. Share price and dividend pay-out data are
collected from the database FININFO which also contains the daily closing prices for the French
market index SBF. The interest rate on short term government bonds is used as a proxy for the
riskfree rate and collected from the Statistiques Annuelles de la Société des Bourses Françaises
(SBF).
Information about direct and indirect blockholdings of at least 5 percent is also collected from the
DAFSA fiches, which also provides information about whether or not a director represents a large
shareholder, a debtholder (bank) or the founding family.
Information about the board of directors and turnover of CEO, chairman and executive directors is
collected from several sources. The database of the Banque de France contains for each director of
a listed company, the name, date of birth, dates of nomination to and resignation from the board. A
press search using Les Echos and l’Annuaire des Sociétés Cotées Desfossés (Dafsa-Desfossés) is
used to check the nomination and resignation data and to distinguish between natural and
conflictual turnover.
D. The UK
Accounting data were collected from Datastream. Share price data, dividends and annual abnormal
returns are gathered from the London Share Price Database (LSPD).
Ownership data are collected from the Directors’ Report or the notes in hardcopy annual reports.
All share stakes over 3 percent are collected as well as all directors’ shareholdings. In 1989, the
statutory disclosure threshold for outside shareholders was reduced from 5 percent to 3 percent. As
well as beneficial shareholdings, we include all non-beneficial ones held by directors on behalf of
families and charitable trusts. Directors do not obtain cash flow benefits from these holdings but
they have control rights. We also investigate nominee holdings and find that in 95 percent of the
cases, institutional investors use the nominee registration to reduce administrative costs. The
nominee shareholdings are classified according to category of shareholder using nominee
accounts.
Data on the composition of the board of directors are compiled from annual reports, Datastream, the
Financial Times and Nexus databases. They include the names, tenure and age of the CEO,
chairman, and all directors, both executive and non-executive. Like for Belgium and France, we
distinguish between natural and other turnover, the latter being a noisy measure of conflictual
turnover. Reasons for directors’ resignations as well as age and tenure of directors are collected from
the notes in the annual reports.
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Table 1
Characteristics of the Board of Directors
This table shows the board characteristics: board size (for Germany of the management and supervisory boards separately,
whether or not the CEO is also the board chairman (1=yes), the percentage of non-executive directors on board (for Germany
this is taken as the percentage of supervisory board members on management and supervisory boards), percentage of
representatives of the shareholders, of the debtholders or of the founders on the board (and of the management and
supervisory boards for Germany), if applicable. The table shows the means, medians, 25 and 75 percentiles and standard
deviation. Source: own calculations based on the data of which sources are presented data appendix.
Panel A : Germany
Average 1987-94 Obs. 25%    median mean 75% Std. Dev.
Supervisory board size 2377 6 6 9.2 12 5.3
Management board size 2378 2 3 3.5 4 2.3
CEO=Chairman (yes=1) 2379 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
% Non-exec. Directors 2377 66.7% 75.0% 71.8% 75.0% 9.4%
% Shareholder representatives 2377 50.0% 66.7% 63.2% 66.7% 13.2%
Panel B : Belgium
Average 1989-94
Board size 727 5 8 9.4 11 5.9
CEO=Chairman (yes=1) 724 0.0% 0.0% 35.2% 100.0% 47.8%
% Non-exec. Directors 602 66.7% 80.0% 73.9% 85.7% 17.9%
Panel C: France
Average 1989-92
Board size 1071 7 9 9.5 11 3.7
CEO=Chairman (yes=1) 1255 100.0% 100.0% 85.9% 100.0% 34.8%
% Non-exec. Directors 1254 80.0% 87.5% 85.4% 92.3% 10.6%
% Shareholder representatives 1255 0.0% 8.3% 12.0% 20.0% 14.7%
% Debtholder representatives 1253 0.0% 0.0% 9.3% 14.3% 16.1%
% Founders' representatives 1255 0.0% 0.0% 3.9% 0.0% 12.4%
Panel D : UK
Average 1989-93
Board size 1071 7 9 9.5 11 3.7
CEO=Chairman (yes=1) 1071 0.0% 0.0% 32.7% 100.0% 46.9%
% Non-exec. Directors 1071 30.0% 40.0% 39.5% 50.0% 14.6%
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Table 2
Board turnover in Germany, Belgium, France and the UK
This table shows the average yearly turnover of the CEO, the executive directors, the chairman (if applicable) and
the non-executive directors. In addition, the median, 75 percentiles and the standard deviation are presented. Source:
own calculations with data of which sources are presented in the data appendix.
Obs. Median Mean 75% Std. Dev.
Panel A : Germany
Average 1987-94
CEO turnover 2379 0.00% 15.13% 0.00% 35.84%
Executive turnover 2378 0.00% 12.19% 20.00% 21.50%
Chairman turnover 2377 0.00% 14.93% 0.00% 35.65%
Non-exec. turnover 2377 0.00% 12.93% 16.67% 17.64%
Panel B : Belgium
Average 1989-94
CEO turnover 735 0.00% 7.35% 0.00% 26.11%
Executive turnover 587 0.00% 19.60% 20.00% 36.88%
Non-exec. turnover 601 0.00% 7.27% 10.53% 13.97%
Panel C: France
Average 1989-92
CEO turnover 1255 0.00% 18.41% 0.00% 38.77%
Executive turnover 1251 0.00% 10.86% 0.00% 28.30%
Turnover chairman 1260 0.00% 18.57% 0.00% 38.90%
Panel D : UK
Average 1988-93
CEO turnover 1071 0.00% 12.51% 0.00% 33.10%
Executive turnover 1071 0.00% 8.95% 16.67% 13.99%
Total board turnover 1071 0.00% 7.60% 12.50% 10.71%
Non-exec. turnover 1052 0.00% 5.02% 0.00% 13.47%
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Table 3
Performance, firm size and debt variables
This table presents performance, debt and size measures for Germany, Belgium, France and the UK. ROA, ROE and ROS stand respectively for return on assets (where return is earnings
before interest and taxes, EBIT), return on equity (where return is EBIT), return on sales (where return is EBIT). These measures are corrected for the industry median. Mkt. Adj. return is the
share price return (corrected for dividends and stock splits) minus the market return, Tobin’s Q is approximated by market value of equity and book value of debt divided by total assets.
Losses (t and t-1) and Losses (t, t-1 and t-2) are dummy variables equal to 1 if a company has losses in the years t and the previous year, and in the year t and the two previous years,
respectively, Dividend cuts is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm has dividend cuts and omissions over the previous year. Debt on assets and on equity is total debt divided by total assets
and book value of equity, respectively. Interest coverage is the EBIT divided by interest charges. The total Sales and Assets are given in millions of Euro.  Source: own calculations with data
of which the sources are presented in the data appendix.
ROA
(ind. adj.)
ROE
(ind. adj.)
ROS
(ind. adj.)
Mkt. adj.
return
Tobin’s
Q
Tobin’s Q
(ind. adj.)
Losses
(t and t-1)
Losses (t,
t-1 and t-2)
Divid.
Cuts
Debt on
Assets
Interest
Coverage
Debt on
Equity
Sales
(m. Euro)
Assets
(m. Euro)
Panel A : Germany
25% -2.1% -5.0% -1.7% -16.1% 0.36 -0.20 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.26 1.88 0.36 59 39
Median 0.9% 0.7% 0.9% 0.5% 0.59 0.00 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.40 4.19 0.68 180 121
Average 1.3% 1.5% 4.3% 0.6% 0.80 0.16 3.2% 1.1% 7.0% 0.41 54.81 1.09 1758 1339
75% 4.8% 7.8% 3.6% 16.7% 1.00 0.35 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.55 10.32 1.23 752 518
Stan. Dev. 9.1% 26.1% 30.1% 27.0% 0.70 0.67 17.7% 10.3% 25.5% 0.20 418.72 1.65 5394 4698
Obs. 2376 2375 2278 1591 1439 1439 2374 2349 2378 2377 2337 2377 2278 2378
Panel B : Belgium
25% -3.6% -6.3% -6.3% -18.2% 0.42 -0.26 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.11 1.54 0.12 1 14
Median 0.2% 0.5% 0.0% -2.6% 0.74 0.00 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.33 4.47 0.50 10 52
Average -0.5% -0.1% -7.6% 2.1% 1.09 0.35 7.6% 4.7% 35.7% 0.36 384.52 1.10 182 384
75% 4.5% 10.3% 4.0% 15.3% 1.13 0.42 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.56 17.20 1.40 65 205
Stan. Dev. 13.0% 25.2% 54.3% 37.2% 1.49 1.47 26.6% 21.1% 48.0% 0.26 2121.01 1.73 608 1048
Obs. 689 672 510 687 575 575 680 665 468 681 599 665 692 692
Panel C : France
25% -2.6% -9.9% -2.8% -24.5% 0.39 -0.23 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.11 0.46 0.28 50 77
Median -0.1% -0.5% 0.0% -8.4% 0.62 -0.02 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.21 1.53 0.63 290 384
Average -0.5% -1.6% -2.7% -8.8% 0.79 0.08 14.1% 10.2% 36.6% 0.23 3.08 1.10 1634 5388
75% 2.1% 6.4% 3.1% 6.6% 1.00 0.28 0.0% 0.0% 100.0% 0.34 3.08 1.32 1230 1374
Stan. Dev. 6.0% 24.3% 23.8% 25.5% 0.59 0.52 34.9% 30.2% 48.2% 0.16 8.16 1.70 3829 23415
Obs. 936 932 857 564 384 384 927 916 1228 797 800 796 861 1248
Panel D: UK
25% -7.0% -9.0% -3.4% -28.6% 0.78 -0.49 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.04 2.83 0.04 166 50
Median -0.7% -0.8% -0.2% -7.9% 1.30 -0.03 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.16 5.17 0.21 343 141
Average -0.9% -0.5% 0.1% -5.7% 1.72 0.33 2.0% 0.4% 16.4% 0.19 14.13 0.37 1533 745
75% 6.6% 8.8% 3.9% 14.3% 2.17 0.68 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.30 10.23 0.48 950 449
Stan. Dev. 16.7% 19.5% 8.6% 38.7% 1.47 1.41 13.9% 6.4% 37.1% 0.16 32.33 0.55 5567 2286
Obs. 972 969 955 1031 965 965 969 959 986 989 959 989 957 989
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Table 4
Ownership Concentration
This table shows the ownership concentration of all large share stakes for Germany, Belgium, France and the UK by category of owner. Large share stakes are
defined (in line with the local disclosure regulation) as 5% for France, Belgium and Germany and 3% for the UK. The data reflect the averages over 1987-94 for
Germany, 1989-1994 for Belgium, 1988-92 for France and 1988-93 for the UK. The results are not significantly different when using the period 1989-1992 as
common denominator. The table shows the 25 and 75 percentiles as well as means, medians and standard deviations. Source: own calculations with data of which the
sources are presented in the data appendix.
Sum of all large shareholdings by category  Largest of all large shareholdings by category
Obs. 25% median mean 75% St.Dev. 25% median mean 75% St.Dev.
Panel A : Germany
Holding companies 2378 0.0 0.0  2.4 0.0 11.1 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.0 11.1
Banks 2378 0.0         0.0 7.1 0.0 18.8 0.0 0.0 6.4 0.0 17.5
Investment funds 2378 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 2.2 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 2.2
Insurance companies 2378 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 9.0 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 8.9
Indust.&commercial co’s 2378 0.0 0.0 21.6 39.6 35.0 0.0 0.0 20.8 30.0 34.4
Individuals and Families 2378 0.0 0.0 14.1 5.0 28.6 0.0 0.0 13.7 5.0 28.2
Government 2378 0.0 0.0 2.0 0.0 9.6 0.0 0.0 1.9 0.0 9.0
Executive Directors 2378 0.0 0.0 10.2 0.0 26.2 0.0 0.0 10.1 0.0 26.0
Non-executive Directors 2378 0.0 0.0 8.7 0.0 23.3 0.0 0.0 8.5 0.0 22.9
For all categories 2378 50.1 75.1 67.9 90.6 27.6 38.7 60.0 60.1 87.4 29.8
Panel B : Belgium
Holding companies 656 0.0 6.8 23.3 59.3 29.9 0.0 0.0 12.9 23.0 19.2
Banks 656 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 6.0 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 5.9
Investment funds 656 0.0 0.0 2.3 0.0 8.9 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 5.6
Insurance companies 656 0.0 0.0 1.7 0.0 8.4 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.0 6.1
Indust.&commercial co’s 656 0.0 0.0 9.1 1.8 22.8 0.0 0.0 7.9 0.0 20.8
Individuals and Families 656 0.0 0.0 12.1 11.4 25.5 0.0 0.0 11.6 16.0 21.5
Government 656 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 12.7 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.0 12.9
Real estate 656 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.0 1.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
For all categories 656 32.1 56.3 52.2 75.0 29.6 17.0 32.0 36.6 52.0 23.6
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Panel C: France
Holding companies 1260 0.0 0.0 14.7 13.3 27.0 0.0 0.0 12.9 0.0 26.7
Banks 1260 0.0 0.0 7.1 0.0 19.3 0.0 0.0 5.3 0.0 18.2
Investment funds 1260 0.0 0.0 4.3 0.0 14.3 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 13.6
Insurance companies 1260 0.0 0.0 2.7 0.0 12.7 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 10.3
Non-financial companies 1260 0.0 0.0 15.0 13.8 27.9 0.0 0.0 12.3 0.0 26.6
Indust.&commercial co’s 1260 0.0 0.0 3.3 0.0 12.8 0.0 0.0 2.5 0.0 12.3
Government 1260 0.0 0.0 12.6 10.3 25.1 0.0 0.0 9.8 0.0 23.1
Real estate 1260 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.0 5.8 0.0 0.0 0.5 0.0 5.6
Executive Directors 1260 0.0 0.0 4.4 0.0 14.3 0.0 0.0 3.8 0.0 13.2
Non-executive Directors 1260 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 6.6 0.0 0.0 0.8 0.0 5.9
For all categories 1260 22.6 67.3 66.0 84.4 22.6 34.5 52.4 52.9 70.4 25.5
Panel D : UK
Banks 1071 0.0 0.0 1.3 0.0 3.6 0.0 0.0 1.2 0.0 3.2
Investment funds 1071 0.0 8.4 12.0 18.1 13.4 0.0 5.4 6.6 9.1 7.4
Insurance companies 1071 0.0 3.7 5.1 8.1 6.1 0.0 3.6 3.5 5.9 3.5
Indust.&commercial co’s 1071 0.0 0.0 5.8 5.8 12.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 5.7 10.7
Individuals and Families 1071 0.0 0.0 2.4 0.0 8.1 0.0 0.0 1.6 0.0 5.1
Government 1071 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.1 0.0 1.0
Executive Directors 1071 0.0 0.8 7.2 7.4 13.6 0.0 0.6 5.1 5.2 9.5
Non-executive Directors 1071 0.0 0.0 4.0 1.2 9.9 0.0 0.0 3.0 1.0 7.8
For all categories 1071 20.3 36.6 38.0 53.4 22.6 7.0 11.6 15.4 20.5 12.8
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Table 5
Changes in Ownership Concentration
This table shows the percentage of firms with changes in ownership concentration by category of owner and by size bracket for Germany, Belgium, France and the UK. The purchases
include both increases in ownership by existing blockholders and the emergence of new blockholders. The data reflect the averages over 1988-94 for Germany, 1990-1994 for Belgium,
1989-92 for France and 1989-93 for the UK. The results are not substantially different when using the period 1989-1992 as common denominator. Source: own calculations with data of
which the sources are presented in the data appendix.
% of companies with share stake purchases % of companies with share stake sales
Obs. ]5-10%] ]10, 25%] ]25-50%] ]50-100%] No ∆ Obs. ]5-10%] ]10, 25%] ]25-50%] ]50-100%] No ∆
Panel A : Germany
Holding companies 2378 13.2 26.3 36.8 23.7 2340 2378 3.6 17.9 42.9 35.7 2350
Banks 2378 25.4 46.0 17.5 11.1 2315 2378 33.3 31.5 25.9 9.3 2324
Investment funds 2378 16.7 50.0 16.7 16.7 2372 2378 11.1 55.6 22.2 11.1 2369
Insurance companies 2378 19.2 65.4 11.5 3.8 2352 2378 11.1 66.7 11.1 11.1 2360
Indust. & commercial co’s 2378 10.1 25.7 29.7 34.5 2230 2378 8.1 26.1 29.7 36.0 2267
Individuals and Families 2378 15.2 29.5 26.8 28.6 2266 2378 18.4 38.0 20.2 23.3 2215
Government 2378 23.3 36.7 10.0 30.0 2348 2378 11.1 22.2 33.3 33.3 2360
For all categories 2378 11.7 29.7 28.4 30.2 1994 2378 11.8 29.8 29.8 28.7 2015
Panel B : Belgium
Holding companies 732 46.4 30.4 21.7 1.4 663 732 33.3 41.4 12.6 12.6 645
Banks 732 28.6 28.6 0.0 42.9 725 732 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 731
Investment funds 732 58.3 33.3 8.3 0.0 720 732 22.2 22.2 33.3 22.2 723
Insurance companies 732 75.0 25.0 0.0 0.0 724 732 37.5 37.5 25.0 0.0 724
Indust. & commercial co’s 732 25.9 25.9 22.2 25.9 705 732 22.2 44.4 11.1 22.2 714
Individuals and Families 732 36.8 44.7 7.9 10.5 694 732 29.7 27.0 18.9 24.3 695
Government 732 0.0 66.7 11.1 22.2 723 732 18.2 54.5 27.3 0.0 721
For all categories 732 35.3 34.6 17.0 13.1 579 732 29.0 33.5 20.6 16.8 577
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Panel C: France
Holding companies 1260 41.3 29.9 12.0 16.8 1093 1260 49.1 30.4 10.7 9.8 1148
Banks 1260 42.7 28.1 16.9 12.4 1171 1260 50.8 24.6 15.4 9.2 1195
Investment funds 1260 43.8 37.5 12.5 6.3 1196 1260 50.7 28.8 8.2 12.3 1187
Insurance companies 1260 44.0 29.3 9.3 17.3 1185 1260 47.5 27.1 8.5 16.9 1201
Indust. & commercial co’s 1260 42.3 30.3 13.4 14.1 1118 1260 39.4 37.6 11.9 11.0 1151
Individuals and Families 1260 86.7 13.3 0.0 0.0 1245 1260 65.2 26.1 4.3 4.3 1237
Government 1260 66.7 22.2 11.1 0.0 1251 1260 26.7 53.3 13.3 6.7 1245
Executive Directors 1260 38.5 53.8 7.7 0.0 1247 1260 42.9 46.4 7.1 3.6 1232
Non-executive Directors 1260 43.8 43.8 6.3 6.3 1244 1260 63.6 36.4 0.0 0.0 1249
For all categories 1260 29.9 35.0 17.1 18.1 768 1260 33.2 35.9 15.2 15.7 853
Panel D : UK
Banks 1071 63.5 34.6 1.9 0.0 1019 1071 73.3 23.3 3.3 0.0 1041
Investment funds 1071 47.9 46.3 5.0 0.8 693 1071 59.6 34.2 4.4 1.8 846
Insurance companies 1071 81.4 18.6 0.0 0.0 953 1071 88.3 10.0 1.7 0.0 1011
Indust. & commercial co’s 1071 51.5 35.1 12.4 1.0 974 1071 48.3 39.3 10.1 2.2 982
Individuals and Families 1071 53.7 31.7 12.2 2.4 1030 1071 62.2 35.1 2.7 0.0 1034
Government 1071 100.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 1068 1071 50.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 1069
Executive Directors 1071 46.7 35.6 17.8 0.0 1026 1071 50.0 36.8 11.8 1.5 1003
Non-executive Directors 1071 33.3 56.7 10.0 0.0 1041 1071 59.0 38.5 2.6 0.0 1032
For all categories 1071 32.1 49.7 16.0 2.2 441 1071 37.7 46.5 13.0 2.7 594
Table 6a Tobit results of executive turnover with as performance: industry-adjusted ROA and ROE
This table shows Tobit regression results explaining executive turnover, which is measured as the number of leaving executive directors to the number of all executive
directors. Intercept, time dummies as well as two-digit country-specific industry dummies are included but not reported. Note: ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance of
respectively 1%, 5% and 10%. Definition of variables is presented in section 3.2. Source: own calculations.
Executive turnover Model 1: Industry adjusted return on assets Executive turnover Model 2: Industry adjusted return on equity
Germany Belgium France UK Germany Belgium France UK
Coeffic. p-value Coeffic. p-value Coeffic. p-value Coeffic. p-value Coeffic. p-value Coeffic. p-value Coeffic. p-value Coeffic. p-value
1. Perform at t 0.011 0.960 -0.011 0.976 -1.553 0.113 -0.486*** 0.007 -0.113 0.148 0.206 0.289 -0.336 0.093 -0.438*** 0.006
2. Perform at t-1 -2.485 0.128 0.853 0.692 -10.254 0.134 -0.093 0.924 -1.888*** 0.004 1.320 0.235 -1.469 0.363 0.034 0.967
3. Perform at t-2 -0.314 0.222 -0.424 0.160 -0.706 0.458 0.259 0.205 -0.047 0.582 -0.274 0.113 -0.282 0.206 0.122 0.507
4. Blockholder: individuals/families 0.001* 0.066 -0.004 0.116 -0.001 0.645 -0.005*** 0.006 0.001* 0.053 -0.004* 0.099 -0.001 0.595 -0.005*** 0.005
5.      Interaction with performance 0.013 0.151 0.013 0.562 0.015 0.772 -0.007 0.559 0.005 0.172 0.011 0.340 0.013 0.305 -0.004 0.646
6. Blockholder: financial 0.001 0.283 -0.003 0.405 -0.001 0.572 -0.003 0.178 0.001 0.256 -0.002 0.570 -0.001 0.703 -0.003 0.150
7.      Interaction with performance 0.012 0.397 0.100*** 0.003 0.025 0.552 -0.016 0.187 0.006 0.359 0.039* 0.057 0.007 0.619 -0.013 0.220
8. Blockholder: non-financial 0.001* 0.056 0.000 0.890 0.004* 0.084 0.000 0.126 0.001** 0.039 -0.001 0.496 0.004* 0.058 0.000 0.999
9.      Interaction with performance 0.014 0.126 0.038*** 0.002 0.020 0.596 -0.004 0.799 0.005 0.124 0.028*** 0.000 0.014 0.170 -0.007 0.616
10. Blockholder: government 0.000 0.998 -0.011 0.006 0.000 0.892 -0.011 0.531 -0.001 0.568 -0.010** 0.040 0.002 0.464 -0.008 0.626
11.    Interaction with performance -0.043 0.356 0.024 0.558 0.145** 0.035 -0.146 0.590 -0.056** 0.042 0.011 0.604 0.010 0.493 -0.085 0.704
12. Increases in blocks: indivi/fam. 0.007*** 0.001 0.003 0.619 0.013 0.151 0.012*** 0.001 0.007*** 0.000 0.003 0.674 0.010 0.309 0.013*** 0.001
13.    Interaction with performance 0.003 0.864 -0.110 0.109 0.223 0.480 0.016 0.521 0.006 0.317 -0.003 0.907 0.078 0.118 -0.001 0.965
14. Increases in blocks: financial 0.002 0.486 -0.020 0.115 -0.003 0.534 0.001 0.642 0.002 0.453 -0.012 0.173 -0.005 0.342 0.001 0.624
15.    Interaction with performance -0.120* 0.082 -0.100 0.630 0.043 0.462 0.004 0.805 -0.053* 0.054 -0.115 0.258 0.017 0.327 0.002 0.861
16. Increases in blocks: non-fin. 0.003** 0.012 0.009*** 0.002 0.004** 0.048 0.002 0.774 0.003*** 0.013 0.011*** 0.000 0.003* 0.078 0.001 0.795
17.    Interaction with performance -0.009 0.531 -0.028 0.109 -0.050 0.154 -0.033 0.318 -0.007 0.163 -0.016** 0.049 -0.009 0.329 -0.024 0.360
18. Increases in blocks: government -0.002 0.503 0.030*** 0.003 -2.774 n.a. -0.038 0.595 -0.002 0.518 0.017 0.543 -2.502 n.a. -0.038 0.599
19.    Interaction with performance 0.008 0.913 0.014 0.797 -20.256 n.a. -0.061 0.911 0.014 0.760 -0.366 0.308 -8.240 n.a. 0.028 0.955
20. Debt ratio 0.032 0.760 0.310 0.119 -0.128 0.654 0.217 0.242 0.276*** 0.005 0.404* 0.063 -0.064 0.822 0.392** 0.035
21.     Interaction with performance 0.238 0.802 1.170 0.398 5.004 0.219 -0.053 0.936 1.367*** 0.001 -1.545* 0.051 -0.287 0.742 0.036 0.949
22. Interest coverage 0.000* 0.089 0.000 0.757 -0.010 0.237 0.000 0.626 0.000* 0.058 0.000 0.708 -0.002 0.742 0.000 0.618
23.     Interaction with performance 0.001 0.591 -0.003** 0.045 0.313*** 0.007 0.001 0.877 0.000 0.763 -0.002 0.131 0.075** 0.013 0.002 0.644
24. Board size 0.039*** 0.000 0.021** 0.011 0.016 0.276 0.041*** 0.000 0.041*** 0.000 0.022** 0.010 0.013 0.347 0.044*** 0.000
25.     Interaction with performance 0.004 0.949 -0.196** 0.040 -0.328 0.215 -0.010 0.863 0.024 0.436 -0.014 0.766 -0.083 0.247 -0.032 0.492
26. Non-executive dir./all dir. -1.503*** 0.000 0.652*** 0.006 0.540 0.186 -0.588*** 0.001 -1.496*** 0.000 0.747*** 0.002 0.540 0.179 -0.616*** 0.001
27.     Interaction with performance 0.109 0.962 -0.767 0.754 12.709* 0.057 0.333 0.757 0.166 0.811 -1.570 0.201 1.663 0.305 0.685 0.431
28. log(assets) -0.034 0.105 -0.020 0.475 0.000 0.998 -0.057** 0.017 -0.037* 0.076 -0.052* 0.085 0.010 0.720 -0.061*** 0.012
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood -2508.591 -2490.355
Number of obs. 4199 4175
Corporate monitoring by blockholders in Europe: 36
Table 6b. Tobit results of executive turnover with market-adjusted return and market-to-book ratio
This table shows Tobit regression results explaining executive turnover, which is measured as the number of leaving executive directors to the number of all executive
directors. Intercept, time dummies as well as two-digit country-specific industry dummies are included but not reported. Note: ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance of
respectively 1%, 5% and 10%. Definition of variables is presented in section 3.2. Source: own calculations.
Executive turnover Model 3: market-adjusted share price return Executive turnover Model 4: market-to-book ratio
Germany Belgium France UK Germany Belgium France UK
Coeffic. p-value Coeffic. p-value Coeffic. p-value Coeffic. p-value Coeffic. p-value Coeffic. p-value Coeffic. p-value Coeffic. p-value
1. Perform at t -0.107 0.153 0.172 0.167 0.030 0.885 -0.079 0.171 0.073 0.353 -0.266** 0.016 -0.532*** 0.001 -0.024 0.284
2. Perform at t-1 -0.110 0.855 0.085 0.880 0.359 0.876 0.078 0.823 -0.179 0.556 0.483 0.235 -0.907 0.420 0.022 0.844
3. Perform at t-2 -0.069 0.300 -0.021 0.818 0.234 0.227 -0.129* 0.057 -0.082 0.281 0.194** 0.013 -0.082 0.532 -0.003 0.889
4. Blockholder: individuals/families 0.002* 0.042 -0.003 0.137 -0.004 0.411 -0.004** 0.030 0.002** 0.045 -0.004** 0.040 -0.005 0.196 -0.004** 0.010
5.      Interaction with performance 0.006* 0.042 0.008* 0.091 -0.027 0.143 -0.002 0.587 0.000 0.789 -0.001 0.761 -0.004 0.663 0.000 0.841
6. Blockholder: financial 0.000 0.987 0.003 0.325 -0.011** 0.019 0.000 0.820 -0.001 0.637 0.001 0.679 -0.015*** 0.007 -0.002 0.332
7.      Interaction with performance 0.002 0.710 0.006 0.219 -0.027* 0.072 -0.002 0.643 0.003 0.313 -0.001 0.842 -0.003 0.588 0.000 0.850
8. Blockholder: non-financial 0.001 0.128 0.001 0.600 -0.001 0.719 0.000 0.935 0.002** 0.039 0.000 0.846 -0.002 0.460 0.000 0.826
9.      Interaction with performance -0.001 0.809 0.014*** 0.001 -0.022* 0.073 0.001 0.918 -0.001 0.492 0.004* 0.058 -0.008 0.237 0.002 0.200
10. Blockholder: government 0.001 0.568 -0.010** 0.013 -0.006 0.156 -0.008 0.622 0.002 0.429 -0.022** 0.045 -0.007* 0.081 -0.015 0.552
11.    Interaction with performance -0.007 0.501 0.001 0.929 -0.039** 0.014 0.002 0.987 0.007 0.213 -0.034 0.267 -0.001 0.887 -0.015 0.715
12. Increases in blocks: indivi/fam. 0.006** 0.016 0.005 0.378 0.011 0.491 0.010** 0.003 0.005* 0.097 0.002 0.807 0.000 0.982 0.011*** 0.000
13.    Interaction with performance 0.003 0.627 -0.003 0.845 -0.072 0.443 -0.006 0.620 0.010** 0.010 -0.031 0.218 -0.083** 0.041 0.001 0.539
14. Increases in blocks: financial -0.001 0.840 -0.016 0.130 0.016** 0.040 0.003 0.210 -0.001 0.880 -0.019 0.128 0.005 0.362 0.002 0.309
15.    Interaction with performance 0.019 0.207 -0.021 0.652 0.035* 0.082 0.001 0.830 -0.005 0.548 0.008 0.815 0.019 0.360 0.000 0.977
16. Increases in blocks: non-fin. 0.002 0.308 0.008*** 0.005 0.006** 0.032 0.001 0.834 0.002* 0.086 0.011*** 0.000 0.003 0.379 0.002 0.650
17.    Interaction with performance 0.013** 0.015 0.006 0.481 0.019 0.121 -0.014 0.313 -0.009** 0.018 0.001 0.861 0.008 0.250 -0.010* 0.067
18. Increases in blocks: government -0.001 0.882 0.028*** 0.000 -0.245 n.a. -0.036 0.623 -0.002 0.496 0.023 0.138 0.006 n.a. -0.042 0.531
19.    Interaction with performance 0.011 0.482 0.038 0.113 1.714 n.a. -0.020 0.913 -0.012 0.321 0.016 0.768 0.759 n.a. -0.079 0.643
20. Debt ratio 0.113 0.341 0.252 0.119 -0.184 0.722 0.084 0.621 0.048 0.716 0.216 0.245 -0.629 0.226 0.283* 0.064
21.     Interaction with performance -0.407 0.317 -0.613 0.117 -0.906 0.556 -0.440 0.281 0.295 0.178 -0.257 0.295 -2.046* 0.083 -0.150 0.167
22. Interest coverage 0.000 0.153 0.000** 0.010 -0.119*** 0.001 0.000 0.534 -0.001* 0.089 0.000 0.315 -0.018 0.358 -0.001 0.266
23.     Interaction with performance 0.000 0.394 -0.001*** 0.005 -0.367*** 0.001 0.001 0.642 0.000 0.103 0.000* 0.073 0.000 0.990 0.000 0.578
24. Board size 0.032*** 0.000 0.016** 0.022 -0.004 0.848 0.037*** 0.000 0.036*** 0.000 0.023*** 0.001 -0.007 0.760 0.038*** 0.000
25.     Interaction with performance -0.008 0.588 -0.022 0.387 0.009 0.906 -0.006 0.781 0.007 0.502 -0.013 0.287 0.013 0.711 0.001 0.857
26. Non-executive dir./all dir. -1.106*** 0.000 0.726*** 0.000 1.497** 0.037 -0.460*** 0.005 -1.333*** 0.000 0.638*** 0.002 0.648 0.302 -0.376** 0.015
27.     Interaction with performance -0.103 0.898 -0.116 0.838 1.867 0.472 -0.359 0.435 0.059 0.883 -0.699 0.109 1.718 0.200 -0.130 0.385
28. log(assets) -0.025 0.305 -0.036 0.149 -0.046 0.358 -0.038* 0.061 -0.053** 0.037 -0.069** 0.012 -0.107** 0.046 -0.065*** 0.002
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood -1725.026 -1600.703
Number of obs. 3027 2853
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Table 7.  Logit results of  CEO turnover with as performance: industry-adjusted ROA and ROE
 This table shows Logit regression results explaining CEO turnover, which is a dummy variable. Intercept, time dummies as well as two-digit country-specific industry dummies are included but
not reported. Note: ***, ** and * stand for statistical significance of respectively 1%, 5% and 10%. Definition of variables is presented in section 3.2. Source: own calculations.
CEO turnover Model 1: Industry adjusted return on assets CEO turnover Model 2: Industry adjusted return on equity
Germany Belgium France UK Germany Belgium France UK
Coeffic. p-value Coeffic. p-value Coeffic. p-value Coeffic. p-value Coeffic. p-value Coeffic. p-value Coeffic. p-value Coeffic. p-value
1. Perform at t 0.404 0.631 -1.164 0.565 -8.078** 0.011 -1.715** 0.012 -0.245 0.378 0.709 0.536 -2.754*** 0.000 -1.535** 0.013
2. Perform at t-1 -15.583** 0.016 9.963 0.313 8.154 0.714 -2.732 0.505 -6.662*** 0.009 7.536 0.162 5.580 0.337 -1.632 0.633
3. Perform at t-2 0.853 0.373 -2.469* 0.083 -5.515* 0.072 1.081 0.202 0.474 0.140 -1.503* 0.076 -0.558 0.417 1.356* 0.078
4. Blockholder: individuals/families 0.007** 0.016 0.002 0.784 0.002 0.881 -0.021** 0.016 0.007** 0.017 0.007 0.652 0.002 0.788 -0.020** 0.024
5.      Interaction with performance 0.093*** 0.005 0.245* 0.052 -0.406** 0.016 -0.003 0.947 0.010 0.416 0.119** 0.038 -0.066 0.115 -0.003 0.941
6. Blockholder: financial 0.006 0.181 0.016 0.380 0.007 0.410 0.003 0.671 0.006 0.171 0.023 0.156 0.005 0.539 0.004 0.631
7.      Interaction with performance 0.070 0.186 0.297** 0.040 -0.363** 0.011 0.005 0.929 0.023 0.300 0.087 0.341 -0.095** 0.040 -0.008 0.850
8. Blockholder: non-financial 0.007** 0.010 0.006 0.439 0.005 0.469 -0.001 0.928 0.007** 0.014 0.005 0.603 0.006 0.375 0.001 0.930
9.      Interaction with performance 0.070** 0.035 0.156*** 0.011 -0.329** 0.011 0.127* 0.064 0.006 0.604 0.130*** 0.000 -0.074** 0.030 0.068 0.228
10. Blockholder: government 0.008 0.389 -0.018 0.272 0.013 0.110 0.000 0.995 0.006 0.477 -0.012 0.567 0.015* 0.068 0.003 0.957
11.    Interaction with performance -0.126 0.493 0.152 0.313 -0.069 0.714 -0.046 0.956 -0.060 0.500 0.037 0.743 -0.030 0.441 0.188 0.789
12. Increases in blocks: indivi/fam. 0.015** 0.034 -0.039 0.636 0.031 0.350 0.025* 0.090 0.014** 0.039 -0.046 0.521 0.015 0.666 0.023 0.128
13.    Interaction with performance 0.045 0.512 -1.241* 0.071 -2.288* 0.070 -0.098 0.445 0.018 0.332 -0.177 0.331 0.357 0.193 -0.101 0.366
14. Increases in blocks: financial -0.010 0.553 -0.494 0.154 0.009 0.545 -0.004 0.754 -0.004 0.766 -0.196 0.319 0.013 0.381 -0.003 0.811
15.    Interaction with performance -0.278 0.373 5.391 0.126 -0.218 0.342 -0.027 0.692 -0.079 0.446 0.450 0.650 -0.024 0.581 -0.036 0.536
16. Increases in blocks: non-fin. 0.009** 0.042 0.047*** 0.000 0.010 0.104 0.002 0.936 0.009* 0.059 0.048*** 0.000 0.011** 0.063 -0.002 0.943
17.    Interaction with performance -0.017 0.761 -0.058 0.518 0.228 0.115 -0.082 0.560 -0.021 0.297 -0.026 0.526 0.035 0.309 -0.093 0.398
18. Increases in blocks: government -0.058 0.249 0.096** 0.037 0.130 0.497 -0.145 0.817 -0.068 0.293 0.095 0.330 0.227* 0.079 -0.062 0.873
19.    Interaction with performance 0.218 0.863 0.115 0.608 -0.232 0.962 -2.451 0.724 -0.164 0.814 -0.677 0.538 -2.665 0.152 -1.135 0.729
20. Debt ratio -0.238 0.538 -0.226 0.824 -0.226 0.552 0.317 0.682 0.306 0.413 -0.369 0.765 -0.997 0.299 0.467 0.545
21.     Interaction with performance -2.092 0.553 -6.429 0.416 18.327 0.212 2.092 0.415 3.694** 0.017 -9.269** 0.050 6.969*** 0.029 2.411 0.280
22. Interest coverage 0.000 0.772 0.000 0.591 0.002 0.928 -0.002 0.673 0.000 0.407 0.000 0.688 0.011 0.525 -0.002 0.683
23.     Interaction with performance -0.002 0.581 -0.024* 0.062 0.599* 0.063 0.015 0.521 -0.002 0.485 -0.017* 0.064 0.138 0.115 0.011 0.615
24. Board size 0.088*** 0.003 0.037 0.373 -0.008 0.872 0.072* 0.065 0.085*** 0.004 0.059 0.155 -0.004 0.930 0.072* 0.067
25.     Interaction with performance -0.418* 0.086 -0.601 0.212 -0.375 0.652 0.124 0.610 -0.172 0.125 -0.148 0.488 -0.217 0.323 0.053 0.774
26. Non-executive dir./all dir. -2.195** 0.017 0.646 0.622 2.767** 0.044 -0.551 0.471 -2.123 0.021 0.297 0.824 2.840** 0.044 -0.621 0.417
27.     Interaction with performance 11.286 0.191 -11.668 0.348 24.383 0.262 -1.101 0.804 4.208 0.138 -8.591 0.124 0.710 0.906 -0.603 0.866
28. log(assets) -0.134* 0.077 0.261* 0.098 -0.054 0.588 -0.054** 0.034 -0.139* 0.068 0.132 0.457 -0.020 0.834 -0.208** 0.040
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Time dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood -1536.898 -1530.667
Number of obs. 4195 4152
Appendix :
Table A1
Tobit results: Executive turnover and performance
This table shows the Tobit regression results of executive turnover (dependent variable) and current and lagged
performance. Source: own calculations with data of which the sources are presented in the data appendix.
Panel A: industry-adjusted return-on-assets
Germany Belgium France UK
coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value coefficient p-value
Performance t -0.025 0.917 -0.264 0.382 -1.653** 0.036 -0.407** 0.033
Performance t-1 -1.226*** 0.000 0.376 0.252 -0.004 0.997 -0.626*** 0.006
Performance t-2 -0.294 0.268 -0.964*** 0.001 0.841 0.307 0.370* 0.097
Log likelihood -2899.768
Number of obs. 4536
Panel B: industry-adjusted return-on-equity
Performance t -0.125 0.131 0.148 0.417 -0.043 0.768 -0.344** 0.046
Performance t-1 -0.295*** 0.001 -0.103 0.564 -0.085 0.582 -0.419** 0.040
Performance t-2 -0.057 0.527 -0.364** 0.033 -0.052 0.739 0.298 0.139
Log likelihood -2886.475
Number of obs. 4503
Panel C: industry-adjusted return-on-sales
Performance t 0.303*** 0.001 -0.029 0.785 -0.079 0.719 -1.087** 0.011
Performance t-1 -0.319*** 0.007 -0.075 0.528 -0.009 0.975 -1.195** 0.018
Performance t-2 0.008 0.934 -0.118 0.305 0.288 0.285 0.629 0.165
Log likelihood -2611.811
Number of obs. 4172
Panel D: market-adjusted stock market return
Perform -0.054 0.512 -0.059 0.616 0.057 0.740 -0.086 0.151
Perform1 -0.237*** 0.003 0.097 0.295 -0.147 0.423 -0.292*** 0.000
Perform2 -0.073 0.320 -0.080 0.376 0.047 0.784 -0.172** 0.015
Log likelihood -2144.634
Number of obs. 3448
Panel E: industry-adjusted market-to-book ratio
Performance t -0.035 0.579 -0.088 0.187 -0.518*** 0.000 -0.024 0.312
Performance t-1 0.056 0.538 -0.024 0.729 0.192 0.183 -0.008 0.752
Performance t-2 -0.098 0.178 0.047 0.376 -0.070 0.567 -0.004 0.869
Log likelihood -1829.671
Number of obs. 2979
Panel E: operating losses in two subsequent years (dummy variable is –1 when loss occurs)
Performance t -0.339*** 0.001 -0.163 0.333 -0.430*** 0.003 -0.486*** 0.007
Performance t-1 -0.094 0.446 -0.074 0.725 -0.137 0.475 -0.237 0.384
Performance t-2 -0.208 0.146 -0.256 0.200 0.502*** 0.006 -0.236 0.355
Log likelihood -2700.611
Number of obs. 4203
Panel G: dividend cut or omission (dummy variable is –1 when dividend cut occurs)
Performance t 0.073 0.365 0.066 0.595 -0.089 0.217 -0.165** 0.038
Performance t-1 -0.033 0.659 0.044 0.693 -0.042 0.603 -0.180** 0.050
Performance t-2 -0.007 0.922 -0.011 0.917 0.134 0.109 -0.093 0.353
Log likelihood -2748.422
Number of obs. 4310
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Figure 1
Ownership and control structure of the Group Brussels Lambert
Situation on 1 March 2001. Source. Trends.
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